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Foreword 
 
The global development landscape is rapidly changing with the acceleration of 
South-South cooperation. This is particularly relevant for African countries 
who have witnessed a significant increase in trade, foreign direct investment, 
aid and other development assistance from emerging and new development 
partners such as Brazil, China, India, South Korea and Turkey. In recent 
years, these emerging development partners have greatly expanded their 
cooperation with Africa within the context of various initiatives, leading to a 
new type of strategic partnership. 
 
The increasing engagement in Africa of emerging development partners is 
broadening the options for growth in the continent and presents real and 
significant opportunities for the development of African countries, including 
particularly, for implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) and the attainment of the Millennium Development 
Goals. Furthermore, in the light of the prevailing global economic and financial 
crisis, this new cooperation becomes even more significant. Despite the crisis , 
many of the emerging development partners show relatively sound growth 
prospects. 
 
The theme of Africa’s cooperation with new and emerging development 
partners is part of the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa’s work 
programme in the context of its broader mandate to assist in Member States’ 
debates on new, emerging issues regarding Africa’s development, particularly, 
in connection with the implementation of NEPAD. In this context, the Office 
aimed to formulate specific policy recommendations on how to effectively 
harness the development potential of the emerging development partners’ 
intensifying economic and business relationships with African countries. To 
this effect, UN-OSAA initiated a study on “Africa’s Cooperation with New and 
Emerging Development Partners: Options for Africa’s Development”. The key 
findings and recommendations of the study were validated by the expert 
group meeting which was co-organized with the African Union Commission 
and UNECA in Addis Ababa in February 2009. The present publication 
includes the study and the summary of the expert group meeting. 
 
The study and the discussions at the expert group meeting highlighted the fact 
that Africa’s cooperation with new and emerging development partners has 
created both opportunities and risks  for Africa. Within the new geo-economic 
context, the main challenge for African countries is how to benefit from the 
new opportunities, while minimizing the potential negative impacts. Above all, 
it is important to ensure that cooperation with new partners leads to economic 
diversification and industrial development in Africa, as well as supporting the 
continent’s integration into the global economy. To maximize their bargaining 
power, the study recommends that African governments carefully manage 
their interactions with the emerging partners and develop a strategic focus  so 
that they benefit from this interaction. In particular, African governments 
should work together to develop a regional strategy towards this new 
cooperation. At the same time, the international community, in particular the 
African Development Bank, the United Nations  and OCED/DAC can support 
  2 
the efforts of African countries through monitoring and capacity building. By 
basing this cooperation on common objectives which are consistent with 
national and regional development strategies, the cooperation can lead to 
‘win-win’ outcomes for all stakeholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
Cheick Sidi Diarra 
Under-Secretary-General and 
Special Adviser on Africa 
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SUMMARY 
 
Emerging economies are making a rapid entry into Africa. The speed and 
significance of this entry means that they provide many opportunities for 
African economies; but, at the same time, their growing presence poses risks 
to Africa’s future growth. 
 
The presence of emerging economies in Africa may promote both 
complementary win-win, and competitive win-lose outcomes. At the same 
time, some of the impacts of interaction may be direct and visible, reflected in 
bilateral relationships, whilst others may be indirect and less visible (for 
example, competition in third-country markets, or competition for scarce global 
resources).  
 
The primary vectors of interaction between Africa and the emerging 
economies are aid, trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). In recent 
decades, northern economies have increasingly separated-out interactions in 
these three vectors – aid has been untied, and clearly distinguished from 
investment, and aid and investment have only loosely been associated with 
trade. The analysis of the links between Africa and seven key emerg ing 
economies - Brazil, China, India, Korea, Malaysia, Russia and Turkey - in this 
report suggest a different evolving experience. More often, there has been 
close strategic integration between these three vectors in the operations of 
these emerging economies in Africa. 
 
The distinctive features of each of these emerging economy actors in Africa 
are described in the main report and in further detail in the Annexes. The 
direct and indirect impacts on, and challenges for a range of African 
stakeholders are outlined. It is clear from this that whilst some emerging 
economies have a strategy for Africa, Africa does not have a strategy towards 
the emerging economies. 
 
In the interests of promoting this emerging strategy, and in ensuring the 
optimal outcome of deepening links between these emerging economies and 
African countries , a number of policy issues are outlined, with 
recommendations for key development actors. These recommendations are 
as follows: 
 
African governments  should: 
 
· Monitor trade, aid and FDI interactions with emerging countries ; 
· Analyse strategic objectives of emerging economies, and opportunities 
and threats arising from their entry; 
· Develop strategic focus to maximise benefits  – in the words of the Paris 
Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, to exercise “ownership” 
over these growing interactions ; 
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· Interact with other African governments, African Union (AU), African 
Development Bank (AfDB) and regional groupings to maximise 
bargaining power and avoid wars of incentives; 
 
Within their specific mandates, the AU, the AfDB, NEPAD and African 
Regional Organisations such as COMESA, ECOWAS and SADC should: 
 
v Provide support for individual African governments in the 
monitoring of trade, aid and FDI interactions with emerging 
countries ; 
v Coordinate strategic analysis where action is appropriate at 
continental or regional level; 
v Facilitate coordinated bargaining where this is appropriate  to 
include the interests not just of commodity exporting economies, 
but also non-exporting economies. 
· The AU, the AfDB and the ECA should establish dialogue which 
provides for a coordinated review of relations with the emerging 
economies, and where relevant (as in the forthcoming UN High Level 
Conference on South-South Cooperation), involve other relevant 
multilateral organisations in this dialogue; 
 
· The ECA should provide assistance with the compilation of relevant 
statistics and through its flagship publication, The Economic Report on 
Africa, monitor the trajectory of aid, trade and FDI relations between 
Africa and the emerging country partners; 
 
· A specific challenge arises for the AfDB in how to leverage emerging 
economy support for the financing and co-financing of regional 
infrastructure ; 
 
· The Africa Partnership Forum should be widened to include participation 
by non-OECD emerging economies . 
 
Multilateral organisations in the UN-family, the OECD/DAC, and the WTO 
should: 
· Provide support for individual African governments in the monitoring of 
trade, aid and FDI interactions with emerging countries; 
· Coordinate strategic analysis where action is appropriate at continental 
or regional level; 
· Facilitate coordinated bargaining where this is appropriate; 
· Help build capabilities in recipient countries to develop an adequate 
strategic response to relations with emerging economies ; 
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· Provide support to the World Bank’s call for Sovereign Wealth Funds to 
invest in the development of Africa’s infrastructure. 
Emerging country governments should : 
· Recognise that  flows of finance to Africa – both development aid and 
FDI – will entail future repayments, and that every effort should be made 
to avoid Africa entering a new realm and era of debt dependency; 
· Recognise that their long-term access to Africa’s natural resources 
depends on developing a non-exploitative relationship which provides for 
win-win outcomes. Thus resource rents should be shared equitably and 
maximum efforts should be placed on developing downstream and 
upstream linkages from the resource sector; 
· Complementary investments in infrastructure designed to facilitate 
access to Africa’s resources should also address the needs of the non-
resource sectors of the economies, of promoting regional infrastructure 
and of also addressing the needs of countries with no, or poor 
resources; 
· Market access should be provided for the preferential entry of African 
products into their markets. However, given poor production capabilities 
in Africa, complementary assistance is required to assist in the building 
of effective production capabilities, particularly in local firms and SMEs; 
· Tolerance should be displayed when African governments seek special 
and differential treatment in third-country markets; 
· Every attempt should be made to include African firms and farms in their 
global value chains producing for global product markets ; 
· In the absence of participating in the Accra Agenda for Action, attention 
should be given to addressing some of its principles, not least the 
objective of ensuring country ownership of aid-inflows and addressing 
the needs of transparency and legitimacy design to prevent corruption 
and the misuse of aid. 
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“The problem is that China has a strategy for Africa, but Africa lacks a strategy 
for China” 
(Comment by Kenyan scholar, 2005) 
 
1. THE ENTRY OF EMERGING ECONOMIES: NEW OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Africa is currently entering an era of disruptive change as new emerging 
economy actors enter the stage. These new entrants have growing economic 
power, and in some cases also significant political influence.  
 
Historically, African economies were closely integrated with the former 
colonial powers in Europe, and with North America and Japan. This was 
reflected in institutions of governance (parliamentary democracies), in 
language (English, French, Portuguese and Spanish complemented and often 
took the place of local languages), in infrastructure (constructed to facilitate 
contacts with western powers), in economic specialisation (Africa supplied 
commodities to, and imported manufactures from the west) and in the 
integration of African producers in western firms (foreign direct investment, 
FDI) and value chains. Financial flows, too, reflected this process of 
integration between African and western powers. In the latter third of the 20th 
century, there was an increasing flow of western financial resources into 
Africa (aid and FDI) and back to the source countries (debt repayment, profits 
and interest).  
 
But the global economy and politics is now entering a period of disruptive 
change. Since 1979 China has grown at a compound growth rate of 9 per cent 
p.a., and India at a similar rate since the early 1990s. This rapid growth is not 
unique – Botswana, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan had all 
grown at similar rates for prolonged periods. But all of these rapidly growing 
economies were small, so that their growth could proceed without changing 
the basic parameters of production and exchange in other countries. 
However, China and India together account for almost 40 per cent of the 
global population, so that when they grow very rapidly for prolonged periods, 
the “small country assumption” has to be suspended. China is likely to 
become the second biggest economy in the world by 2020, and India the third 
largest by 2035. Their size means that their expansion disrupts the path of 
incremental change which has dominated many societies for so long, not least 
the relatively weak and poor economies in Africa. It is for this reason that 
these newly emerging very large Asian economies are referred to as the 
“Asian Drivers”.1   
 
From the African perspective, the most important consequence of Asian 
Driver entry into the global economy is their impact on the global terms of 
trade. The prowess of the Asian economies in manufacturing has led to the 
growth of price competition (and in many sectors, price deflation) in industrial 
                                                 
1  www.asiandrivers.open.ac.uk; see Special Issue of World Development, Vol. 36, No. 
2, 2008. Special Issue of Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 35, No. 115 and 
the forthcoming Special Issue of the European Journal of Development Research 
(2009). 
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goods. At the same time, Asian Driver expansion of infrastructure, the growth 
in their manufacturing sectors and the changing composition of food demand 
towards meat products led to an increase in the price of commodities between 
2001 and 2009. Previous spikes in commodities prices in the 1970s and the 
1950s were short-lived – three-four years in duration. The 2001-2009 Asian 
Driver induced boom in commodity prices lasted more than seven years, and 
will probably be sustained once the financial-sector induced crisis in the global 
economy abates and growth resumes, particularly in China and India who are 
the primary sources of demand for Africa’s commodities. These changing 
terms of trade have major strategic implications for Africa, and frame the 
development of policies specific to particular issues (for example, to aid, to 
foreign investment and to trade negotiations). 
 
This report summarises the major changes emerging in Africa’s interaction 
with the external world arising in large part as a result of the disruptive entry of 
the emerging economies into the global arena. Although China and India are 
the primary sources of disruptive change, they are not alone and their growing 
presence opens the space for other new economic and political actors. The 
report therefore also considers the role played by other emerging economies 
in Africa. These are Brazil, Korea, Malaysia , Russia  and Turkey. These 
economies have been chosen partly because of their size, but also because 
each in its own way represents a particular type of disruptive force. Brazil is 
large and has similar economic parameters to many African economies. 
Korea was once a low income economy similar to  those in Africa currently (in 
the 1960s it had a lower per capita income than Ghana), but has become a 
dynamic knowledge-intensive participant on the global stage; Malaysia and 
Turkey strive to emulate its path. Russia is not just very large, but also is rich 
in resources, as are many African economies.  
 
The central idea behind this focus on new emerging economies in Africa is 
that their growing emergence and deepening links are disruptive of the 
trajectory of social, political and economic change in Africa. They pose a new 
and substantive challenge to Africa – how can African economies make the 
most of the opportunities offered by these new participants on the global 
economic stage, and how can African economies minimise the potentially 
negative impacts posed by their growing presence? 
 
 
2. TRADE, AID AND FDI: KEY VECTORS OF CHANGE2 
 
How might the impact of these rising powers on Af rica be assessed? Three 
key variables are of importance and provide a framework for considering the 
impact for development strategies and policy responses to the entry of new 
emerging economy actors in Africa: 
 
· Their modes of interactions with Africa – this report will focus on Trade, 
FDI and Aid; 
                                                 
2  For an extended discussion of these vectors of change, see Kaplinsky and Messner, 
2008. 
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· The extent to which these interactions are complementary (that is, both 
Africa and the emerging economies gain) or competitive (emerging 
economies gain, Africa loses; or African economies gain and emerging 
countries lose); 
 
· The extent to which these impacts are direct and occur as a result of 
bilateral relations; another set of impacts are those which are indirect in 
nature, for example, China’s trade with the rest of the world affecting 
relative prices, the terms of trade and thus the core development 
strategies of African countries.3 This report will only focus on the direct 
impacts. 
 
Although trade, aid and FDI are considered as independent vectors, this is to 
some extent an artificial separation. In the Colonial era they were fused and 
the imperial powers’ interests in Africa were closely coordinated. For example, 
in the immediate post-war period, British Colonies were seen as providers of 
tradable commodities for UK consumers, involving FDI from UK firms, with 
infrastructure to support this trade provided by the UK Colonial Office (roads 
and ports to transport the tea to the UK). French and Portuguese presence in 
Africa was coordinated in a similar way.  
 
But as Africa was decolonised in the second half of the 20th century, these 
vectors increasingly came to be separated, partly as a result of opposition 
from African countries, partly because new players were entering the field 
(notably the US and the multilateral agencies), and partly due to growing 
public opposition in the OECD economies. Current views on “best practice” 
are that the vectors should be separated. Aid should be untied, and although 
trade and FDI are often closely co-related, this is seen as reflecting an 
outcome of economic processes rather than of concerted government-led 
strategic agendas by source-countries of aid and investment.  
 
This separation of the trade-FDI-aid vectors characteristic of the latter stage of 
western dominance in Africa is now being challenged by some of the 
emerging economies (Section 3). They are explicitly coordinating interventions 
in these vectors in a way which is reminiscent of the earlier periods of Colonial 
rule. African countries need not only to be aware of these inter-linkages, but to 
understand the extent to which these linkages can be manipulated in Africa’s 
own interest. Africa will need to coordinate its response in the same way if it is 
to gain from the opportunities opened by the emergence of new actors on the 
global stage (Section 4). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3  Kaplinsky (2008) 
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3. TRADE, FDI AND AID IN AFRICA: THE GROWING PRESENCE OF 
EMERGING ECONOMIES 
 
Africa’s presence in the global economy closely reflects its economic 
weaknesses. In the case of global trade and incoming FDI, its share never 
rose above four per cent between 1990 and 2006. By contrast, and as a 
consequence of its low levels of per capita income, Africa’s share of global aid 
disbursements was substantial throughout this period, rising to more than 50 
per cent in 2006, the year after the Gleneagles G8 summit (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Africa’s Share of Global Exports, Incoming FDI and as a 
Recipient of Aid Disbursements 
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Africa’s share of global 
exports and incoming 
FDI is small and has 
changed little since 
1990. 
 
By contrast, Africa’s 
share of incoming aid 
has been large, and 
grew to more than 50 
per  cent after the 
Gleneagles summit. 
 
Source: Trade data from COMTRADE (accessed 26 June 2008); Aid data 
from OECD DAC (accessed 26 June 2008); FDI data from UNCTAD 
(accessed June 2008). 
 
3.1. The Emerging Economies and Africa : The Trade Vector 
 
The trade balance in Africa’s trade with the emerging economies  
Africa’s trade with the new emerging economies grew rapidly, from a 
combined export+import total of US$8.8bn in 1990 to US$148bn in 2007.4 
The growth in trade has been particularly marked since 2002. 
 
In 2006 this trade was, in aggregate, almost in balance, with an overall 
surplus of US$2.8bn in 2006, an improvement from a deficit of US$1.7bn in 
1995, but showing little improvement from the surplus of US$1.9m in 2000. 
However, as can be seen from Table 1, this picture of balanced trade masked 
a sharp deterioration in Africa’s non-oil trade balance with these emerging 
economies. This had risen over the same time-period from a deficit of 
                                                 
4 Compiled from IMF DOTS 
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US$7.7bn in 2000 to a deficit of US$35.1bn in 2006. Excluding oil, Africa has 
a negative trade balance with each of the emerging economies except Turkey. 
The deterioration in this balance was most evident in the case of trade with 
China. 
 
Table 1: Africa’s Trade with Newly Emerging Economies, 1995-2006 
(US$Bn) 
 
 Brazil China India Malaysia Russia Korea Turkey 
Total 
Emerging 
Countries 
1995 
Total Trade -0.1 -1.0 0.3 -0.4  0.0 -0.8 0.3 -1.7 
Non Oil Trade -1.1 -1.3 -0.5 -0.4  0.0 -1.8 -0.7 -5.7 
2000 
Total Trade 1.6 0.5 -0.3 -0.4  -0.7 -0.1 1.4 1.9 
Non Oil Trade -0.8 -3.1 -0.5 -0.4  -0.6 -2.2 -0.1 -7.7 
2006 
Total Trade 0.6 2.2 4.5 -1.1  -2.0 -4.2 2.8 2.8 
Non Oil Trade -5.9 -18.8 -3.0 -1.1  -1.0 -7.2 1.9 -35.1 
· In aggregate, Africa’s trade with the newly emerging economies was in balance in 
2006, a similar picture to that which prevailed in 1990  and in 2000. 
 
· If oil is excluded, then Africa’s trade balance with the emerging economies is in 
deficit, with a major increase in this deficit between 1990 and 2006. 
 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, Accessed via WITS July 2008. 
 
How important are the emerging economies in Africa’s trade? 
The significance of these emerging economies to Africa varies. Using trade as 
a proxy of these links, Africa’s exports were historically predominantly 
destined for the EU (Figure 2). That dominance remains – in 2007, it was still 
the case that almost 40 per cent of exports went to the EU – but is declining 
rapidly (from 60 per cent in 1990). The major change in destination has been 
the growth in exports to the USA, largely arising from oil and gas exports, and 
exports of clothing and other manufactures under the AGOA (African Growth 
and Opportunity Act) scheme providing preferential access to US markets. By 
contrast, although Africa’s exports to China (and to a lesser extent Brazil) 
have been growing rapidly, they still comprise a small share of total exports. 
By 2007, exports to the other new emerging economies remained small. The 
rate of change of export growth to China, Malaysia and Brazil has however 
been very rapid (42 per cent, 37 per cent and 24 per cent p.a. respectively 
between 2001 and 2007). 
 
The other side of this Africa-centred trade picture concerns the origin of 
Africa’s imports (Figure 2). In some respects there are similarities with the 
export picture, in that the share of the EU in Africa’s imports remains large, 
but is rapidly diminishing in significance. Similarly, the US has been pushed 
into third place by China as a source of Africa’s imports. The most significant 
change in shares is the growing role of the emerging economies in general, 
and China in particular. Korea, Brazil and India have also become increasingly 
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important as a source of imports into Africa, across the range of sectors – 
consumer, intermediate and capital goods, as well as in specialised services, 
particularly those required to design and construct infrastructure. 
 
Figure 2 : The Importance o f Emerging Economies to Africa’s Trade  
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Most of Africa’s exports go to 
the EU. 
 
The share of Africa’s exports 
going to the EU is declining. 
 
The share of Africa’s exports 
going to China (and Brazil) is 
growing, but is still low . 
 
The share of Africa’s exports 
to Turkey, Malaysia, Korea 
and India remains very small. 
 
Share in Africa’s imports  
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Most of Africa’s imports come 
from the EU. 
 
The share of Africa’s imports 
coming from the EU is 
declining. 
 
The share of Africa’s imports 
coming from China has grown 
rapidly. 
 
The share of Africa’s imports 
coming from the US is falling 
and in 2007 was lower than 
imports from China. 
 
The share of Africa’s imports 
from other emerging 
economies is growing, but 
remains very small. 
 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF), Annual values, accessed via 
ESDS. March 2009. 
 
Most of Africa’s exports to the emerging economies comprise oil and gas 
(Figure 3). In 2006, oil and gas and associated products  accounted for nearly 
half or more of the exports  to the emerging economies, apart from Malaysia, 
Russia and Turkey. Oil was an especially large share of exports to Brazil, 
China and India. 
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Figure 3: Oil and Gas in Africa’s Exports to Emerging Economies 
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Oil and gas comprise 
the overwhelming share 
of Africa’s exports to 
the emerging 
economies. 
 
Malaysia and Russia 
are the exceptions; 
both are themselves oil -
producers. But exports 
to these economies are 
small. 
 
Exports of non-oil 
products have also 
risen rapidly, 
particularly to China, 
India and Korea. These 
overwhelmingly 
comprise commodities. 
 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, Accessed via WITS May 2008.  
 
Another way of assessing the significance to Afric a of trade with the emerging 
economies is in relation to the technological intensity of African exports  (Table 
2). The greater these are, the higher the value added in Africa, and the 
greater the learning and externalities with other sectors. In 2006, 70 per cent 
of Africa’s exports to the world were accounted for by primary products, which 
include crude oil and metal and mineral ores. Africa’s exports to the emerging 
countries are even less technology-intensive than its exports to the world, 
particularly those to Brazil, China and Korea. In each case, the share of 
unprocessed primary products was more than 80 per cent of their total imports 
from Africa. Africa’s exports to Malaysia, Russia and Turkey appear to be 
somewhat more technology intensive. 
 
Table 2: Technological Intensity of Africa’s Exports to the World and to 
the Emerging Economies, 2006 (Percent Share ) 
 
   World Brazil China India Korea Malaysia Russia Turkey 
Primary 70 84 82 67 80 63 65 65 
Resource 
Based 13 10 14 20 12 14 21 17 
Low 
Technolog y 7 1 1 1 2 11 7 4 
Medium 
Technology 7 4 2 2 5 8 2 14 
High 
Technology 1 0 1 0 1 4 5 0 
 
· Most of Africa’s exports are primary and resource-based commodities. 
 
· These commodities are even more important in trade with China and India. 
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· Africa’s exports to Ma laysia, Russia and Turkey include a higher component 
of technology-intensive products. 
 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, Accessed via WITS May 2008. 
Technological classification drawn from Lall (2000). 
 
How important is Africa in the emerging economies’ trade? 
Africa’s strategic response to the opportunities opening up by the growing 
interest of new emerging economies on the continent needs to be informed by 
its leverage in these countries – how important is Africa to them? In aggregate 
(compare Figure 4 with Figure 2), Africa’s importance to trading partners is of 
much lesser significance than their importance to Africa. However, within this, 
there are significant structural differences. First, the emerging countries are 
more dependent on Africa for their  imports than their exports. Second, 
relatively speaking, their dependence on imports from Africa is greater than 
that of the EU and the US. And, thirdly, emerging economies such as Turkey, 
Malaysia and Russia which export very little to Africa, are more dependent 
and have a growing dependence on imports from Africa. This overall picture of 
import dependence is not surprising – most of Africa’s exports are oil and gas 
(see Figure 3 above ) – products which have widespread and supply-
constrained markets throughout the globe. 
 
Figure 4: Importance of Africa in the  Trade of Emerging Economies 
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Africa accounts for a small 
share of the exports of the 
emerging economies . 
 
In general, Africa is a more 
important export destination for 
the emerging economies than 
for the EU and the US and this  
share is growing rapidly. 
 
This dependence is greatest for 
Brazil and India, but Africa’s 
importance as an export 
market is growing for all the 
emerging economies except 
Turkey. 
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Africa’s share of emerging economies imports  
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In general, Africa is a more 
significant provider of imports 
to all partner countries than as 
a market for their exports. 
 
However, whilst its share of 
emerging country imports grew 
rapidly for Brazil and China 
between 2000 and 2007, its 
relative importance declined for 
Turkey, Russia, Korea and 
India. 
 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF), Annual values, accessed via 
ESDS. June 2008. 
 
Given the importance of oil (and, also, of other mineral commodities) in 
Africa’s exports to the emerging economies, it is not surprising that only a 
relatively few African economies are major trading partners to these emerging 
economies (Table 3). The three major African oil exporters (Nigeria, Algeria 
and Angola) and South Africa (which predominantly exports primary 
commodities other than oil) are the major trading partners of all the emerging 
economies except Russia (which is itself a producer of oil and commodities) 
(Table 3). 
 
Table 3:  Percent Share of African Countries in Selected Country’s Total 
Imports from Africa, 2007 
 
  
South 
Africa Nigeria Algeria Angola 
Total Share 
Accounted for 
Brazil  5 47 24 6 82 
China  19 1  33 53 
India  28 3   31 
Korea  25 11 10 3 49 
Malaysia  27 1   28 
Russia  13    13 
Turkey  32 7 31  70 
· Four African economies – South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and Angola 
– are the major providers of imports to all of the emerging 
economies except Russia 
 
 
Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF), Annual values, 
accessed via ESDS. June 2008. 
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3.2. The Emerging Economies and Africa: The Investment Vector 
 
There is a bewildering array of data on inflows of FDI into Africa. A number of 
problems contribute to this confusion. First, country-level reporting of FDI (as 
to the IMF and as contained in the UNCTAD FDI Surveys) is uneven and 
there are major differences in recording practices and ambiguities in the data 
on FDI flows – mergers and acquisitions, levels of foreign ownership and 
reinvested profits are treated by different countries in different ways, and even 
then, data is collected at differential levels of detail. Second, many estimates 
of FDI are based on loose intention, which often fail to materialise, or do so in 
rather different forms to that which is announced with a great fanfare of 
publicity. And third, in some cases (notably China), FDI is bundled together 
with concessional loans, and there is much double-counting, with the same 
ventures being recorded both as aid flows and as inflows of FDI. 
 
Table 4 draws together different estimates of FDI inflows into Africa from the 
emerging economies. It is based on a variety of sources which often provide 
contradictory data. This data shows a generalised increase in incoming FDI 
into Africa from the emerging economies, with significant (and often under-
recognised) inflows from Brazil, Russia and Turkey as well as China and 
India.5 Until 2002, FDI inflows from the emerging economies into Africa were 
small and were dwarfed by those sourced from the UK and the US and other 
traditional western sources of FDI. But in recent years, Africa has seen 
significant inflows of FDI from non-traditional donors, especially China, Brazil, 
Russia and Turkey.  
 
Table 4: Emerging Economy FDI Flows into Africa (US$m) 
Source: Unless otherwise stated, data is from UNCTAD (2007)  
Note: Empty cells do not reflect zero FDI flows, but an absence of information. 
 
* 2003-2006  Chinese Statistical Bulletin 2006 
                                                 
5  In general, the data collected from source countries suggests higher FDI outflows to 
Africa than the data available from the UNCTAD and IMF databases. 
 China India Korea Malaysia Brazil 1 Russia 2 Turkey 3 UK USA 
1991 2  16 1    1069 85 
1992 8  28 13    523 305 
1993 15  84**** 29 7    393 837 
1994 28  134 111 36    500 762 
1995 18  19 38 72    1116 352 
1996   37 8 496    875 1678 
1997   1847 88 148    1020 3436 
1998   191 81 78    -41 3075 
1999 591** 42  175 20 222    1901 596 
2000 551 85 243 222 24 78    2120 716 
2001 708 25 1630*** 185 14 14 49   578 1658 2438 
2002 983 30 116 883 12 7 340 150 1200 652 3291 -578 
2003 2087 75* 238 338 2  1900  942 
2004 317  22 51  411  928 2300 5639 2697 
2005 392  249  176 1400 238  10588 1325 
2006 520          
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** 1999-2003 data in this column represent China’s approved FDI flows into Africa 1999-
2003 from UNCTAD (2007)  
*** 2001-2003  data in this column, Ministry of Finance India 
**** 1993 -2005 data in this column from Korea Export Import Bank as quoted in Kim (2006) 
Brazil 1  2004 from Harsch (2004), 2005 and 2007 calculated on information from 
FDC-CPII (2007) 
Russia 2  M&A purchase, 2004 from Kuncinas  (2006), 2006-2007 from Nestmann and 
Orlova (2008)  
Turkey 3  2003 to 2005 from Zaman (2005), 2006 from www.turkoafrica.com  
 
Based on numerous press statements and industry journals it is possible to 
draw a crude picture of the country and sectoral orientation of emerging 
country FDI into Africa. Table 5 lists the major FDI destinations and sectors for 
each of the emerging economies, focusing on stocks rather than flows. It is 
clear that South Africa is the major source of activity for FDI from each of the 
emerging economies. Its attractions reflect emerging economy investments in 
manufacturing, commodities and services. The importance of oil and gas in 
Africa’s exports identifies the next tier of African economies – Sudan, Angola, 
Algeria and Nigeria. They attract FDI from China, Brazil, India and Malaysia. 
Mining and energy generation follows in importance, in turn followed by the 
related sectors of infrastructure and construction. Although Chinese and 
Indian firms surface in manufacturing, so far this has largely been in the 
clothing sector, with exports destined to the US (and, to a lesser extent, the 
EU). Turkey stands out as an exception, with few investments in oil and gas or 
in raw materials sectors. 
 
Table 5: Country and Sectoral Focus on Emerging Economies FDI in 
Africa, 2000-2006 
 
China  S. Korea  Brazil  India  Russia  Malaysia  Turkey  
S. Africa^ S. Africa* S. Africa* S. Africa S. Africa** S. Africa** S. Africa 
Sudan** Sudan** Sudan  Sudan**   Sudan*   
    Angola**   Angola*     
Algeria* Algeria**         Algeria* 
 Morocco  ^   Morocco       
Nigeria^    Nigeria**   Nigeria**     
      Mauritius**    Mauritius**    
    Mozambique**       Mozambique  
  Egypt**       Egypt  Egypt** 
      Libya     Libya* 
 Zambia* 
 Cote 
d’Ivoire  ^
 Guinea-
Bissau*    Guinea* Chad  ^   
        Botswana  Namibia   
Sectoral focus 
Oil & Gas  Oil &Gas Oil & Gas  Oil & Gas  
Mining Mining   Mining   
Energy  Energy Energy  Energy  
Infrastructure Construction Construction Construction   Construction 
Manufacturing   Manufacturing   Manufacturing 
 Telecomm.  Telecomm.  Telecomm.  
 
· South Africa has been the major destination for FDI from the emerging economies. 
· The next tier of destinations reflect recent investments in oil, predominantly in the Sudan, Angola 
  22 
and Nigeria, and originate from China, Korea, Brazil, Russia and Turkey 
· Investments are also growing in mineral extraction in Zambia, the DRC, Botswana, Russia and 
South Africa. 
· Investments in telecommunications, power generation, construction and infrastructure have been 
growing in importance  
· South Africa is the only African country in which emerging countries have made significant 
investments in manufacturing. Turkey is the only emerging economy with a relative predominance in 
FDI into the manufacturing sector. 
 
Source: Own compilation; various sources (see Annex for details); data for Brazil, 
Turkey, Russia incomplete 
** very significant - >20 per cent  
*  significant - 10 per cent to 20  per cent of total emerging economy FDI 
outflows to Africa 
 ^ 5 per cent to <10 per cent  
Others negligible  - <5 per cent 
 
3.3. The Emerging Economies and Africa: The Aid Vector 
 
Given the growing importance of Africa for the emerging economies, both as a 
source of raw material and as future markets , most emerging economies are 
seeking to engage in Strategic Partnerships with Africa. China, India, Turkey, 
Korea and Brazil have all held large bilateral summits specifically targeted at 
increasing cooperation with Africa in the last few years.  
 
The aid provided by the newly emerging economies to Africa must be seen in 
the larger context of global aid , and global aid to Africa. As was shown in 
Figure 1, Africa has been the major beneficiary of global aid disbursements, 
accounting for more than half of the total in 2006. These aid-flows represent a 
combination of multilateral (30 per cent) and bilateral aid (70 per cent). 
(averages 2000-06). Aid-reporting by DAC countries to Africa is 
comprehensive and can be found on the DAC-OECD website 6. However, 
none of the seven emerging economies considered in this report are members 
of the DAC although two – Korea and Turkey – are members of the OECD 
and report to DAC. The other five emerging economies – Brazil, China, India, 
Malaysia and Russia – are neither OECD nor DAC members. 
 
Hence, there is no coordinated or consistent set of data on aid flows from 
these individual emerging economies to Africa. Moreover, little of the 
assistance provided by some of the emerging economies would qualify as 
“aid”, yet it undoubtedly goes some ways to supporting Africa’s needs for 
finance. For example, since the end of the civil war, China has provided at 
least US$6bn, and possibly as much as US$14bn to the Angolan government 
in loans. The most recent tranche in March 2009 was to aid the expansion of 
agricultural production.7 A careful search of a large number of sources has 
been undertaken and the detailed results – by emerging economy – are 
available in the Annex.  
                                                 
6 http://www.oecd.org/dac 
7 (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i0hpgnhmj3GYfBFS8IbzAJ1WDf5w , 
accessed 13th March 2009). 
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Debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, as well 
as bilateral cancellation of loan agreements have been reached between 
China, Russia and Brazil and many African countries. China’s debt 
forgiveness for 31 African countries  in 2003, amounted to US$1.27bn. 
Between 2006-2009 a further US$1.3bn of debt was cancelled. This debt 
relief reflected both demands from African countries and China’s attempt to 
respond to the call that it fall in step with leading Western donors .  Brazil’s 
debt relief was around US$400m.  
 
As old debts are being cleared, there is growing concern among traditional 
donors of the possible future debt burden on African countries, given the 
heavy concessionary loans being provided by China. As can be seen from 
Box 2, this is one of the major issues which is currently affecting the DRC’s 
very large aid-FDI-trade venture with China. These concerns of traditional 
donors are compounded by the fact that Chinese aid to Africa is generally not 
transparent, and there is considerable ambiguity about the sums lent to 
African countries and on what terms. As traditional donors commit to the Paris 
Declaration (Section 5.2 below), there is concern that the emerging 
economies in general, and China in particular, are not following similar 
disclosure paths .  
 
Since China and India are the key donors amongst these emerging countries, 
this overview section provides a little more detail on their overseas aid 
activities (Box 1). Although both countries have a wide range of aid activities 
in Africa, in general Indian aid is smaller than Chinese aid (although this 
differs in individual countries, for example Ghana – see Annex). Indian aid is 
also more geared towards technical assistance than is Chinese aid, although 
there has been a sharp change in the orientation of Indian aid in recent years, 
and it is beginning to look much like that of China’s aid than it did in the past. 
 
Africa has consistently received support from China over the decades. Alden 
(2007) reports aid commitments  of US$4.9bn between 1957-1989. Africa as a 
region has received the largest share in China’s development assistance, 
around 44 per cent of the total, Chinese aid comprises a mix of tied aid, as 
well as grants and concessional loans. Davies (2006) indicates aid flows 
between 1949-2006 to be around US$5.6bn. These divergent numbers are 
explained by three factors. First, China’s classification of what constitutes aid 
differs from that used by DAC and the OECD. Second, data on aid inflows 
from individual African countries as well as from China are either not collected 
systematically or publicised.  And third, not all aid commitments are realised 
as disbursements and some sources provide data on commitments and 
others on disbursements. Therefore managing a comprehensive number for 
Chinese aid to Africa has been problematic.  
 
China’s integrated strategy in Africa is reflected most clearly in what has come 
to be called the “Angola mode”. This is a scheme of financing in which China 
provides its large state -owned firms with export credits, securitised by access 
to an African country’s resources through agreement with the government of 
the African economy. It builds into the loan considerable use of Chinese 
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inputs since the finance is secured in China and generally is limited to the use 
of Chinese (and some local African) inputs. The terms of these “Angola mode 
agreements” – developed in financing China provided for post civil war 
reconstruction in Angola in exchange for oil – vary and are generally not 
transparent, so it is unclear whether there is any significant grant element in 
the financing. Hitherto, this mode of financing has been used inter alia for 
China’s access to oil in Angola (between US$6bn and US$14bn), for 
manganese exploration rights in Gabon (US$3bn) and for the copper and 
cobalt investments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Box 2). 
 
 
 
Aid from the other emerging economies is both smaller and less well 
documented. Table 6 summarises the available information on aid from 
Korea, India, Turkey and Brazil to Africa. To the extent that this information is 
accurate, it is evident that aid flows from these emerging economies to Africa 
are small in magnitude and that they represent only a small increment to total 
aid inflows into the continent. Moreover, with the exception of Brazil, a 
relatively small share of total external aid is directed towards Africa, much less 
Box 1: Indian and Chinese Aid to Africa 
 
“India and China have different patterns of aid. India concentrates on non-
monetary aid mainly in the form of technical assistance and scholarships, 
while China offers a wider range of monetary and non-monetary aid packages, 
which include grants and loans for infrastructure, plant and equipment, as well 
as scholarships, training opportunities, and technical assistance. Chinese 
monetary aid is tied to the use of Chinese goods and services, and requires 
adherence to the ‘One China’ policy, but does not carry the ‘good governance’ 
conditionalities that currently characterise western donors. Especially in the 
case of China the line between FDI and aid is often blurred, as is the line 
between aid and trade” (McCormick, 2008: abstract p.1).  
 
Type of Aid Assistance from China and India 
 Given by 
Aid Type  China India 
General budget support ü  
Grants/loans for 
infrastructure, plant & 
equipment 
 
ü 
 
 
Scholarships for academic 
training 
ü ü 
Other types of training 
opportunities 
ü ü 
Technical assistance ü ü 
Tariff exemption ü  
Debt relief ü  
 
Source: McCormick, 2008 
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than then the half of total EU aid, the third of total Japanese aid, or the quarter 
of total US trade which goes to the continent. 
 
Table 6: Indian, Brazilian and Turkish Aid to Africa 
 
Source: EU 15, USA, Japan, Korea and Turkey data all from OECD-D AC (accessed May 
2008) 
India: calculations based on data from (Price, 2005), and (India Ministry of Finance);  
Brazil: estimates based on data from (Altenburg & Weikert, 2007), (Schläger, 2007) and 
(Stamm, 2006) 
Note:  
*the data on aid disbursements includes contributions from partner organisations based on a 
rough estimate, i.e. official data multiplied by ten (the factor is an estimate from official 
sources quoted in (Schläger, 2007). Brazil does not publish its development assistance data 
**estimates from (Altenburg & Weikert, 2007), and (Stamm, 2006) 
**** percentage of country share as a total of all DAC ODA 
 
Given that most of the emerging economies are developing countries and aid 
recipients themselves, it is understandable that the flow of financial aid to 
African countries is relatively low compared to the US, Canada, the EU and 
Japan. Capitalising on their own experiences, the emerging economies offer 
non-financial assistance to their African counterparts in a wide variety of 
sectors. The engagement is generally characterised as South-South 
Cooperation and is seen as a way for developing countries to work together.  
 
Cooperation between the emerging economies has been reached through 
bilateral agreements between African Regional Bodies and emerging 
economies as well as through contributions to international organisations 
working on development issues in Africa. While China and India have strong 
bilateral ties, Malaysia, Korea and Russia tend to work through international 
fora such as the Global Fund for Development and the UN organisations. 
Turkey has established relations with the African Union, where it has observer 
status. They have also worked through the African Development Bank to fund 
infrastructure and development projects.  
 
Aid disbursements to Africa 
(US$m) 
 
Share of total aid inflows into 
Africa*** (per cent) 
Aid to Africa as per cent of total 
country aid 
  1990 1995 2000 2006 1990 1995 2000 2006 1990 1995 2000 2006 
EU 15 9,968 8,643 6,273 20,862 40  40  40 48 
51 per 
cent 42  41  52  
USA 3,529 1,847 2,107 5,805 14  8  14  13  42  33  28  27  
Japan 1,069 1,615 1,226 2,621 4  7  8  6  16  16  13  36  
Korea 9 15 24 48 0.04  0.07   0.16  0.11  74  21  19  13  
India … … 1.56 4.44  … …  0.01  0.01  … … 1.52  1.52   
Turkey 0 2 0 25 0.00  0.01   0.00  0.06  0  2  2  4  
Brazil … … 24* … … … 0.05  … … … 27-34 ** 
· Aid flows from Brazil, Turkey and India to Africa are small 
 
· These aid flows represent a tiny fraction of aid to Africa 
 
· As a proportion of emerging country aid, Indian and Turkish aid to Africa represents a much smaller proportion than aid 
from the EU, the US and Japan 
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Assistance in various sectors has been provided including health, agriculture, 
education and institution building. Given the diverse nature of the emerging 
economies themselves, they have been able to assist their African 
counterparts across different economic and social sectors. For example Brazil 
and India have shared experiences in the health sector, especially in their own 
struggles against HIV/Aids. Malaysia has provided assistance in banking and 
legal issues, especially in building institutional capacity. Turkey and Korea 
have focused on access to low cost technology as well education and 
agricultural projects.  
 
Assistance in developing human resources through training has been 
encouraged by emerging economies and African countries, through general 
assistance in the education sector by offering scholarships and building 
schools, to more focused areas such as agriculture, banking, legal issues, 
technical training. Brazil has provided vocational training centres for post 
conflict areas, while India  and Korea have sponsored IT centres and training. 
 
Assistance in humanitarian causes has been provided both through financial 
contributions as well as in personnel and materials. Russia has helped to train 
and equip local staff to handle Humanitarian and Rescue issues. China has 
contributed personnel to UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa, as well as 
helping to train and equip African Union peacekeepers.  
 
Given China’s increasing presence in Africa, traditional donors such as the EU 
are encouraging trilateral engagement in the fields of peace and security, 
infrastructure, the environment and agriculture. Given the different agendas 
that the traditional donors and the Chinese are perceived to have, trilateral 
cooperation in the above fields would allow for a joint effort to address 
important development issues within Africa.   
 
3.4. The Integration of Trade, FDI and Aid Vectors: Are the Emerging 
Economies Distinctive? 
 
As observed at the outset of this report, in the early years of colonial rule, 
trade, inves tment and aid from the colonial mother country were closely 
integrated and harmonised to serve the best interests of the colonial power. 
But as colonialism matured and decolonisation proceeded, these integrative 
bonds were weakened. Current “best practice” actively separates these 
vectors of integration. For example, there have been strong moves to untie aid 
and FDI recipient countries are encouraged not to provide special privileges to 
FDI from countries with whom they have extensive trade links or from whom 
they receive aid. Another feature of current “best practice” is the growing 
presence of conditionalities in all three vectors. To some extent this mirrors 
aid conditionalities which characterised aid to Africa during the decades of 
Structural Adjustment in the 1970s and 1980s. During that period, aid support 
was contingent on the acceptance of a particular package of economic 
policies, the “Washington Consensus” agenda. More recently, conditionality 
has reflected political and social agendas. In the case of aid, for example, 
transparency of expenditure and the avoidance of corruption have been 
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implemented through the Paris Club and DAC. In the case of FDI and trade, 
concerns for the environment and for labour and social standards have led to 
a series of standards for products (for example, organic foods and furniture 
made from sustainable forests) and processes (for example, Fair Trade and 
labour standards). 
 
The emerging economies in general, and China in particular, have a 
distinctive position by comparison with this emerging pattern of best-practice 
Aid. Trade and FDI from the OECD economies. In the first place, they 
exercise a much close strategic integration of aid, trade and FDI. This is 
particularly marked in the case of China and is most clearly evident in the 
comprehensive aid package negotiated with the DRC in late 1997 and early 
2008 (Box 2).  
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Box 2. The Strategic Integration of Aid,Trade and FDI: China and the DRC, 2007-2008 
 
The context is one in which the DRC possesses extensive mineral resources, but lacks the 
resources or technology to exploit these. (The total DRC state budget in 2007 was only $1.3bn, 
most of which was used to pay salaries). Before the elections in 2006, the DRC government had 
approved a large number of 35-year mining contracts in processes which were not transparent. 
Reacting to international concern, the new incoming government began a pro cess of reviewing 61 
mining contracts entered into between 1997 and 2003. The ability to review theses contracts was 
strengthened by the existence of an alternative path to exploiting the DRC’s extensive mineral 
deposits, in large part by the Chinese aid-trade-FDI package  signed in 2007 and 2008.  
 
This constituted two large, but related, initiatives. The first entered into in late 2007, involved a 
loan for $8.5bn from the Chinese EXIM Bank. This was to promote exploitation of the mining 
sector, and was supplemented with a further $5bn loan in early 2008. Together, these loans were 
securitised by providing China with access to, and security provided by $14bn of copper and 
cobalt reserves. (The DRC has one-third of global cobalt reserves and 20 per cent of global 
copper reserves). This aid was tied to an investment package to exploit these mineral resources 
by a jointly owned company, Socomin, owned by Chinese (68 per cent) and Congolese (32 per 
cent) state -owned companies. The $3bn investment in the mines will be repaid out of future 
profits. By agreement, not more than 20 per cent of the workforce can be Chinese, 0.5 per cent of 
investment will be allocated to training, a further one per cent will be spent on social investments 
and three per cent on environmental projects in the surrounding areas. In addition, at least 12 per 
cent of the work will be sub-contracted to local firms. 
 
In addition to these investments in mines, China will provide support for investments in five key 
areas identified by the DRC state – in water, electricity generation, education, health and 
transport. $8.5bn will be allocated to a variety of projects which include a high -voltage power 
distribution network, highway and railway extensions, and the construction of 31 hospitals, 145 
health clinics, 5,000 houses and two universities. Additional resources are allocated to rehabilitate 
and expand water supplies. Supplementing all of this, are a range of additional aid projects, 
including training programmes in China for poverty reduction and subsidised loans to construct the 
national People’s Palace (the parliament) and the Stadium of the Martyrs outdoor and sports 
complex. 
 
In early 2009 the IMF sought to block this investment, arguing that the DRC could not enter into a 
new arrangement with  a privileged preferential creditor when it still owed western creditors 
$11.5bn. The DRC government and the Chinese investors however reaffirmed their commitment 
to this large investment in March 2009. 
 
Source: Vandaele, 2008; Komesaroff, 2009; “Wild” (2009)   
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4. MAKING THE MOST OF OPPORTUNITIES: HOW CAN AFRICA TAKE 
ADVANTAGE OF THE RISE OF THE EMERGING ECONOMIES? 
 
How can Africa make the most of the opportunities provided by these new 
disruptive entrants? In what areas do the major opportunities arise? What 
strategies might be employed to ensure the most successful outcomes? And 
who are the main bargaining parties? These are the questions which need to 
be addressed if the most can be achieved for Africa in a rapidly-changing 
world. 
 
Here a distinction needs to be drawn between a strategic response to the 
entry of the new emerging economies into the African economy, and the 
specific policies which are adopted to best implement these strategies. 
Policies are contextual – they reflect specific agendas, specific parties and 
specific points in time. It is clearly not feasible to map out these polices for 
more than 50 African countries, let alone for the external bilateral and multi-
lateral agencies who have traditionally dominated aid and policy agendas in 
Africa. For this  reason, the remainder of this report addresses the key 
strategic issues which might productively frame the development of specific 
policy responses. 
 
Before setting out this strategic agenda, however, Section 4.1. summarises 
the key developmental impacts of the emerging economies on Africa. This 
summary needs to be read in conjunction with the more detailed discussion in 
Sections 4.2-4.5 below. 
 
4.1. The Developmental Impact of the Emerging Economies on Africa in 
Summary 
 
The relatively recent arrival of the emerging economies in Africa’s economic 
and political landscape means that their developmental impact is as yet only 
embryonic. However it is possible to discern some major trends in relation to 
five sets of stakeholders - consumers, the manufacturing sector, the 
agricultural sector, the commodities sector, and governments. 
 
The developmental impact on African consumers 
The impact of the emerging economies on Africa’s consumers has in general 
been positive. Their trade impact has led to a fall in the prices of many key 
consumer goods, particularly basic consumer goods such as clothing and 
footwear. To some extent this reflects a change in product mix, that is, that 
consumer goods produced by the emerging economies are not only generally 
cheaper than like-for-like alternatives from traditional trading partners, but are 
also aimed at lower income consumers. They are thus more appropriate to 
African conditions. 
 
Another important area of advantage to consumers has been in the provision 
of core generic medicines which are appropriate to African conditions, and in 
particular to the provision of cheap retroviral drugs and insecticide-dipped 
mosquito nets which significantly help to reduce malaria. African consumers 
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have also gained from the availability of improved infrastructure, including 
enhanced railways, roads and bridges and telecommunications. 
 
The one exception to this positive impact on consumers is with regard to food 
prices. Changing terms of trade (Section 4.3 below), largely induced by China 
and India, led to increases in the price of food across a range of agricultural 
products  during the 2001-2008 supercycle and look likely to be sustained in 
the future . These increases are not limited to foods which the emerging 
economies necessarily import directly, since there is a large measure of 
substitutability between crops and the inputs used in agriculture (for example, 
energy, pesticides and fertilisers) which are often generic in nature. Unlike the 
cheapening of manufactured products which are predominantly consumed by 
middle- and upper-income citizens, rising food prices hit the poor directly, and 
disproportionately hard.  
 
The developmental impact on Africa’s manufacturing and infrastructural 
sectors 
The impact of the emerging economies on the manufacturing sector has 
generally been adverse, and significantly so. Many opportunities in export 
markets have been foreclosed, or have only remained open due to the 
sustaining by northern economies of trade preferences for African exporters. 
Manufacturers targeting their own domestic markets have also been severely 
disadvantaged by competitive imports from the emerging economies, 
particularly from China. Another casualty from emerging economy competition 
is the construction sector involved in large infrastructural projects. This has 
particularly adversely affected South African firms, since Chinese competition 
has driven other infrastructure providers out of many markets. This arises not 
just from the efficiency of Chinese firms, but also from the strategic integration 
of Chinese aid with the competitive bids of Chinese construction firms, tied to 
the acquisition of Chinese-sourced inputs . An interesting side-effect of 
Chinese competition is that it is not just South African and northern firms who 
have been squeezed out of many markets, but also those from Brazil (as in 
the case of Angola). 
 
Set against this generally negative impact on Africa’s manufacturing and 
infrastructure sectors, the provision of cheap and appropriate capital goods 
from the emerging economies has provided many African producers with 
lower cost and more effective productive capacity. A more complex, but also 
important, positive outcome of emerging economy presence in Africa has 
been that the provision of cheap consumer goods such as basic clothing has 
helped to moderate wage pressures in other sectors. 
 
The developmental impact on Africa’s agricultural sector 
In principle, with most of its population in the agricultural sector, Africa stands 
to gain from an Asian Driver induced shift in the terms of trade. However, for a 
number of reasons, the reality has been rather different. First, the crops in 
which Africa has a global comparative advantage – particularly beverage 
crops (tea, coffee and cocoa) are in general not subject to the same upward -
pricing pressures as grains, pulses and animal feeds. Second, despite Africa’s 
large land-mass, most countries in Africa are not especially well-endowed in 
  31 
the resources required to produce these in-demand crops. Third, one of the 
major consequences of emerging economy demands for hydrocarbon-based 
energy has been the rise in prices of oil-based agricultural inputs, especially 
transport, fertilisers and insecticides. Fourth, more than 50 per cent of all 
African farmers are in food deficit. Thus , an increase in food prices may, on 
balance, in fact be detrimental to small scale and poor farming families. And, 
fifth, not all African countries are exporters of agricultural commodities – less 
than half of all African economies (that is, 22 out of 54 countries) account for 
more than 80 per cent of soft-commodity exports. 
 
The developmental impact on Africa’s commodities sector 
Those African economies which are producers of oil, gas and minerals based 
hard commodities are potential beneficiaries of the changing terms of trade. 
Some African economies, notably Botswana, have harvested these resource 
rents wisely. But in other cases, there have been a range of negative impacts 
which, from the developmental perspective, have drowned out the windfall 
gains arising from rising commodity prices. An example of this has been 
Zambia, where rising copper prices have led to a sharp appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. Coupled with the legacy of macro-policies adopted during 
recent World Bank and IMF-induced policy reforms (for example, tax-holidays 
and privatisation), little of the boom in copper prices during the 2001-2008 
supercycle accrued to Zambian stakeholders (Bova, 2008: Weekes, 2008). An 
additional negative outcome from the commodity boom has been the ability 
which rising prices have given to some African governments, under global 
pressures on human rights (for example Sudan) or the transparency of aid-
spending (Angola) to withstand global attempts to impose better forms of 
governance. 
 
An additional factor has been the uneven spread of hard commodity exports 
amongst African countries. Only five African countries account for more than 
80 per cent of all oil and gas exports and virtually all of the remaining African 
economies are net importers of oil. In fact during  2007 and the first  eight 
months of 2008, the increasing burden of rising oil prices wiped out all of the 
foreign exchange benefits arising from increasing aid to African oil-importing 
economies. The consequences of rising oil prices as peak-oil approaches are 
likely to make this a long-term problem for much of Africa. Similarly, only 12 
African economies account for more than 80 per cent of all of Africa’s exports 
of hard commodities. 
 
The developmental impact on African governments 
In many respects the primary beneficiaries of the impact of emerging 
economies in Africa have been on the government sector. New injections of 
aid have in some cases allowed for improvement in the run-down facilities 
which civil servants and politicians use, such as parliamentary buildings and 
housing for civil servants. In some cases, notably prospectively in the case of 
the DRC (see Box 2 above), emerging economy investments have led to an 
increase in government revenue through joint venture partnerships in mineral 
expansion, and through the ability provided to renegotiate asymmetrical 
agreements with traditional economic partners. Peace-keeping forces 
provided by China and India have also played a role – albeit small – in the 
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attempts in some African countries to reduce internal conflict. Finally, African 
governments have been aided in their negotiations with traditional aid donors 
to withstand Washington Consensus policy reform by drawing on alternative 
emerging country resources, as well as on the policy experience of countries 
such as China and India which runs counter to that often prescribed by 
international institutions. It has augmented the policy-space for new 
approaches to African development. 
 
But insofar as incoming aid from the emerging economies requires repayment 
(as opposed to being grants), there is a danger that large inflows with 
associated grace-periods may obscure the longer term implications of these 
flows for future indebtedness.  
 
4.2. Setting the Strategic Agenda 
 
There are more than 50 countries in Africa, and this report addresses their 
relations with seven emerging economies. Each of these economies has its 
own history. They have different endowments  and are at different stages of 
development. Some African countries are landlocked and some have large 
desert tracts. Population densities vary enormously, and human skills are 
unevenly developed within and between countries. Perhaps most importantly, 
the different countries on the continent have very different political and 
governance systems, with varying capacities to focus and implement strategic 
choices. At the same time, although the seven emerging countries considered 
in this report have in common their desire, as relatively new entrants, to 
deepen their links with Africa, they, too, differ enormously in their 
endowments, needs and strategic capabilities.  
 
For these and related reasons, it is neither feasible nor desirable to set out a 
single path in which individual African countries, or groups of African  
countries should interact with these new disruptive entrants into the global 
arena. Notwithstanding this cautionary note, Africa clearly has an enormous 
opportunity to restructure its external relations by capitalising on the entrance 
of these new economies. In what follows, this report sets out some of the key 
parameters which may be addressed, but does so only at general level to 
illustrate how these opportunities may be grasped. Policy definition, and 
especially policy implementation, are not optimised through reports and paper 
documents. They reflect interactions and commitments between key 
stakeholders and it is here that the primary actions are required. 
Rationalisation through reports often follows strategic discussions and 
decisive action. 
 
In preparing the way for a process of strategic formulation, the remainder of 
this report sets out some of the key issues which need to be considered. This 
begins with a recognition of the bargaining power which some, but not all 
African countries have in the context of a likely commodities’ boom and terms 
of trade reversal (Section 4.3), despite the fallback in commodity prices arising 
from the financial-sector induced global crisis which emerged after September 
2008. For the gains to be realised, strategic investments need to be made in 
infrastructure and human resource development (Section 4.4). But 
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notwithstanding these economic opportunities, Africa faces enormous social 
challenges, and these, too, need to be met (Section 4.5). In all these cases, a 
strategic focus is critical, and this raises the question of who in Africa might 
assist in defining and executing this strategic response to the entrance of new 
emerging economies in Africa (Section 5.1). 
 
4.3. The Commodities Boom and the Terms of Trade Reversal 
 
The period between 2001 and 2008 saw a sharp rise in commodities prices. 
This is not the first time in post war history that commodity prices have risen, 
but the previous price spikes in the 1950s and the 1970s were short-lived in 
nature. They were short-lived since the primary drivers of rising commodity 
prices (the Korean and Middle East Wars) were temporary in nature. This time 
round, the rise in commodity prices is fuelled by growth in major consuming 
economies, particularly China, but India is also about to enter the global 
market for commodities. China’s structural growth has fuelled a demand led 
Super Cycle in Commodity Prices, that has been interrupted by the Financial 
Crisis in 2008. Unlike the previous commodity booms in 1951-53 and 1973-
75, the 2003-08 commodity boom is likely to resume an upward trend driven 
by the nature of China’s domestic growth (Farooki, 2009). Both these giant 
Asian Driver economies are at the early stages of their commodity-intensive 
growth paths and short of a major collapse in their growth trajectories, their 
thirst for energy and mineral products is likely to be sustained for some time 
(Kaplinsky, 2006). Moreover, as incomes in these two economies rise, food 
consumption patterns are changing in favour of meat products and this, and 
the associated drive for global energy security and biofuels has now also led 
to a sustained increase in agricultural prices. Thus, once the global economic 
crisis begins to resolve and Chinese and Indian growth resumes, then there is 
the likelihood and the interrupted commodities boom will be resumed.8  
 
                                                 
8   It is often forgotten that “rising commodities prices” implicitly assumes relative prices 
of manufacturing and services. As commodities’ prices have fallen in 2009, so have 
those of many manufactures and traded services . 
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Figure 5 : Monthly Index of Commodity Prices, 1992-2009 (2005=100) 
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Source: http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp, accessed 16th March 2009 
 
But rising commodity prices in themselves do not necessarily change the 
economic equation for different countries. It is the relative change in prices 
that is important in terms of trade, for economic strategy. Here, too, the global 
economy has experienced significant changes in recent years. Growing 
competence in manufacturing in Asia in general and China in particular, has 
meant that as commodity pric es have been rising, the prices of manufactures 
have been falling, particularly for the products exported by low income 
economies (Figure 6). It is this change in relativities which challenges 
development strategies everywhere, but especially in Africa (Kaplinsky, 2006 
and 2009). This is because Africa is at a nascent stage of industrial 
development and although it is rich in mineral commodity resources and 
energy, it has considerable potential in these sectors. Africa’s agricultural 
potential is however not strong (Bloom and Sachs, 1998). 
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Figure 6 : Percentage of Sectors with Negative Price Trends, 1988/9-
2000/2001 by Country Groupings 
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Source: Kaplinsky (2005) 
 
What relevance does this have for Africa and its relations with the emerging 
economies? First, the power in many cases now lies with commodity 
producing countries rather than industrial countries. Africa is especially well 
favoured, not so much in terms of its existing commodity exports, but rather in 
terms of its potential exports. Table 7 shows that in many mineral 
commodities, Africa is the primary resource base for the future. In energy, it is 
not so much Africa’s share of global reserves which is so strategically 
important, but its share of unallocated reserves. New hydrocarbon discoveries 
off the west coast of Africa, as well as in Uganda, and the potential for oil 
discoveries in other parts of Africa, make it an exceptionally attractive region 
for countries with rapidly-growing energy needs.  
 
Table 7: Africa’s Share of Global Production and Reserves (per cent) 
 
Mineral Production Reserves 
Platinum Group 
Metals 
54 60+ 
Gold 20 42 
Chromium 40 44 
Manganese 28 82 
Vanadium 51 95 
Cobalt 18 55+ 
Diamonds  78 88 
Aluminium 4 45 
Source: African Development Bank (2007) 
 
But Africa does not only stand to gain from the commodities boom. Although 
mineral potential is widespread in the continent, the current pattern of 
resource exploitation is very concentrated. As shown above, only five 
countries account for more than 90 per cent of all energy exports , only 12 
  36 
countries account for more than 90 per cent of all mineral exports and 
although agricultural exports are more widely-diffused in Africa 22 countries 
account for 90 per cent of exports.  
 
The key, therefore, is for Africa to use this power in commodities to its best 
advantage in its relations with the new emerging powers, particularly in the 
exploitation of these mineral resources and in the provision of related 
infrastructure. The agreement which the DRC reached with China in 2007 and 
2008 shows the potential for using this power to leverage advantageous 
terms, particularly as China and other emerging economies seek to gain 
access to the resources which were previously the domain of western 
economic powers. As Box 2 (above) shows, it is not just that the DRC was 
able to crowd-in aid-assisted Chinese investments in infrastructure and 
training, and to ensure minimum local content, with local co-ownership in 
mineral exploitation, but also that it was able to use this leverage provided by 
China to force the renegotiation of more than 60 35-year mining agreements 
which had previously been reached with western firms. 
 
But, second, the te rms of trade reversal does not only affect commodity 
exporters. It simultaneously also affects manufacturing. Here the im pact of 
China’s entry into global markets has been much more negative for Africa. 
Excluding South and North Africa, more than half of all SSA’s exports of 
manufactures are in clothing products. In the first two years after the ending of 
the Agreement on Clothing and Textiles (which removed quotas on China’s 
and other Asian economies’ exports to the US and the EU), Africa’s clothing 
exports fell by 25 per cent (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008). A similar story can be 
told for furniture and other labour intensive manufactures. Therefore, part of 
the bargain to be reached with the newly emergent economies entering in 
Africa is to ensure that these negative impacts on the very manufacturing 
sectors which are essential for promoting long-term sustainable growth are 
countered. African countries need to ensure that China and other exporters of 
manufactures incorporate Africa in their global value chains which are so 
successful in global markets. For example, Chinese firms may provide textiles 
for Africa, or African-Chinese firms to export to the US under the AGOA 
regime as a substitute for clothing currently being exported to the US directly 
from China. 
 
4.4. Infrastructure and Human Resources 
 
Taking advantage of Africa’s resource potential requires an efficient 
infrastructure. Here Africa is particularly disadvantaged.  It is the highest 
continent with few navigable rivers; 93 per cent of the land mass is in the 
tropics with heavy rainfall; many African states are landlocked, and only 10 
per cent of the land lies within 100km of the coast (compared to 18 per cent in 
the OECD and 27 per cent in Latin America); and only 21 per cent of its 
people live within 100km of the coast compared to 69 per cent for the OECD 
and 42 per cent for Latin America). Africa’s transport and logistic costs are 
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estimated to be 2.5 times the global average.9 As Table 8 indicates, these 
disadvantages in physical infrastructure required to extract commodities and 
ship them to the ports are compounded by high insurance costs. Even within 
developing economies, the share of freight and insurance costs in total 
production costs are higher in Africa than in other developing regions, and are 
particularly high in West Africa and East Africa. The improvement in Africa’s 
infrastructure should therefore be a key objective in taking strategic advantage 
of the entrance of new emerging economies into the African scene. Access to 
primary commodities should be facilitated as  part of a wider process of 
infrastructural development.  
 
Table 8: Freight and Insurance as a Percentage o f Production Costs , 
1997 
 
World 4.1 
Developed countries 3.4 
Developing countries 6.5 
    Africa 10 
    Latin America 5.6 
    Asia 6.5 
Landlocked Africa  
    East Africa 14.6 
    Southern Africa 9.9 
    West Africa 24.6 
Less Developed Countries (1995) 12.5 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2001. 
 
However, Africa should not make the mistakes which characterised 
infrastructural development in the colonial era, in which the primary 
infrastructure was built to ship raw materials out to the ports. Instead, 
consideration in this infrastructural development should be given to the 
promotion of regional infrastructure to ease greater intra-regional trade. This 
has great developmental importance. For example, intra-African trade is 
characterised by much higher technological intensity than in Africa’s trade with 
the external world (and particularly its trade with China and India – see Table 
2 above). It is thus an important vector for promoting diversified economic 
structures and sustainable income growth. Moreover, infrastructural 
development for commodities extraction should also consider the potential for 
providing, at relatively little marginal costs often, spurs which reduce logistics 
costs for surrounding small scale input providers and agricultural producers . 
 
Although primary commodities have a key role to play in the 21st century, long 
term development also requires the development of two other sets of 
infrastructure. The first is telecommunications and, here, Africa is already 
relatively well-served in mobile telecoms, and much of this infrastructure 
                                                 
9  Perkins, D. (2009), “Development Corridors and Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) in 
Southern and East Africa”, MMCP Workshop, University of Cape Town, March. 
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draws intensively on Asian technology, competences and finance. These links 
and investments in telecom infrastructure should be promoted further and 
should, too, be the subject of strategic bargaining with new emerging 
economy entrants into the African continent. 
 
However, the primary infrastructure which Africa requires for long term and 
equitable income growth is the quality of its human resources. Knowledge is 
the key component of production systems. This is pervasive, not just in the 
obvious areas of manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services, but also in 
the commodities sector. Here it is possible to distinguish a low and a high 
road to resource exploitation. Either Africa can remain simply source of raw 
materials, providing little else but basic ores and oil, or it can become a source 
of knowledge for the resource sector. This high road is a path trodden by the 
USA in the 19th century and by Australia and Norway in recent decades, 
where the National System of Innovation was oriented to making the most of 
the commodity resources  (Wright and Czelusta, 2004). Whilst it may appear to 
be a long way from Africa’s current low-tech road to the commodities sector, 
“the longest journey begins with the first step”, and key long-term investments 
in knowledge and human resources need to be made now if Africa is to thrive 
in the future.10 
 
4.5. The Development Agenda 
 
Meeting Africa’s social needs – high and growing levels of absolute poverty – 
is a mammoth task and is the target of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). These social needs have to be addressed at a number of levels, 
including promoting growth, providing access to basic health and education, 
and addressing the needs of specific disadvantaged communities in Africa. 
How much of this agenda can be placed on the plate of the new emerging 
economy entrants?  
 
A key element in the required policy agenda is debt forgiveness. For the 
moment, this is not a big issue in relation to the emerging economies, many of 
whose aid programmes have only been ramped up in very recent years. 
Although it might become a concern in the future, this is not a primary concern 
now. Another key component of the general policy agenda is budgetary 
support. This is an area in which the emerging economies may be expected to 
make only a limited contribution, including perhaps through their participation 
in multilateral agencies. However, since all of the emerging economies are 
themselves either low income economies or foreign exchange constrained 
economies (or both), this is unlikely to be a major realm of activity for them in 
their relations with Africa. At any rate, even if it is likely to become more 
important, there is little specific influence which African countries can have on 
the role played by emerging economies in this process. 
 
Instead, Africa might seek to obtain direct assistance in three key areas in 
which the emerging economies have specific competences. The first of these 
                                                 
10  This policy agenda will be the subject of a research programme to be undertaken by 
a consortium of African and British scholars – see www.commodities.open.ac.uk. 
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is peace-keeping. Here, the emerging economies have the advantage of non-
alignment, and their oft -criticised failure to participate in global sanctions 
against countries such as Sudan, paradoxically gives them particular 
competences in helping to resolve conflicts. China has become especially 
relevant in this regard, and by mid-2008 had sent more 10,000 peacekeeping 
troops abroad, most of them to Africa.11   
 
The second area of support reflects the similar operating environments in 
Africa and many of the emerging economies. Faced with common low income 
consumers, China, India and Brazil have each begun to develop process and 
product technologies which are particularly appropriate for other developing 
countries, including those in Africa. The value of appropriate technology is 
particularly apparent in small scale agriculture, manufacturing and services. 
Already, China and India have become a major source of not just low-cost 
consumption goods in Africa, but also low-cost and appropriate capital and 
intermediate goods, as well as low cost and appropriate services (for 
example, rural telecoms). Drawing on these appropriate technologies and 
skills, including through technical assistance programmes in agriculture, 
health and infrastructure development is a key area for technical assistance 
from the emerging economies. 
 
A final specific area in the social agenda where Africa stands to gain much 
from links with the emerging economies is in relation to the health and 
pharmaceutical sectors in general, and malaria and HIV/AIDS in particular. 
Brazil, China, India and Russia all have major emerging problems with regard 
to HIV infection rates and each, in their own way, has developed specific 
competences in these areas. At the same time, Africa is itself developing 
competences in these critical developmental issues, and a combination of 
technical assistance from, and cooperation with the emerging economies is an 
important strategic asset for Africa to exploit in its relations with these new 
entrants into the global arena. Brazil, for example, has already begun to 
provide support fo r the HIV/AIDS initiative, and Indian pharmaceutical firms 
are major providers of generic drug in East Africa. Both initiatives lend 
themselves to expansion. 
 
 
                                                 
11  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-06/30/content_8466332.htm , accessed 18 th 
July 2008. 
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5.  DEVELOPING A POLICY RESPONSE: IMPLICATIONS FOR KEY 
ACTORS 
 
5.1. Who Might Develop this Strategic Agenda and How Might this 
Happen? 
 
In Section 2 of this report it was observed that in some respects there are 
similarities between the new phase of emerging economy activity in Africa and 
the pattern of interaction between Africa and the colonial powers in the 
colonial era. As in earlier years, to a greater or lesser extent, the newly 
emerging economies are coordinating their agendas in Africa in relation to the 
three primary vectors of interaction – trade, FDI and aid. They, as can be seen 
from Table 9, increasingly “have a strategy for Africa”. However, the problem 
is that Africa “lacks a strategy for the emerging economies”. Four key agendas 
need to be addressed for this strategic gap to be filled. 
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Table 9: The Emerging Economies and Africa 
 
 Africa’s 
importance to 
emerging 
economy 
Emerging 
economy’s 
importance 
for Africa 
Export to 
Africa 
Imports 
from Africa 
FDI to Africa Aid to Africa Strategic integration by 
emerging economy 
Strategic 
integration by 
Africa 
Brazil Energy (short 
term); minerals; 
market for goods 
and services. 
Technology, 
particularly in 
health; 
support for 
infrastructure
. 
Food, 
transport, 
refined 
petroleum, 
iron ore. 
Crude oil 
(formerly 
refined oil 
products) . 
Oil and iron ore and 
coal; infrastructure. 
Debt relief, infrastructure; 
AIDS projects; training; 
biofuels. 
Weak. Brazil seeks African 
support in global arena. 
African-South America 
Cooperative Forum 
established, coordinated by 
Brazil and Nigeria. 
Very little, apart 
from South Africa. 
China Energy, minerals; 
support in global 
fora. 
Source of 
low cost 
technology 
and low 
priced 
consumer 
goods.  
 
Wide range of 
products, of 
increasing 
technological 
content. 
Oil 
predominat
es, and is of 
growing 
importance. 
Some 
imports of 
minerals. 
Predominantly in 
resource sectors, but 
increasing flows to 
manufacturing and 
services. 
Coordinated through FOCAC; 
tied to Chinese firms and 
inputs; extensive technical 
assistance; prestige projects 
(parliament, sports stadiums) 
are important and 
widespread. 
Aid concentrated in oil 
exporting economies; debt-
cancellation 
Very high – initiator of 
numerous fora for 
coordinated discussions; 
close interlinking of aid and 
FDI to trade interests, 
particularly securing long-
term access to Africa’s 
resources; China also seeks 
African support in global 
arena. 
Very little. Mainly 
through FOCAC 
fora organised by 
China. 
India Market (present); 
source of raw 
materials (future). 
Source of 
cheap 
products; 
technical 
assistance. 
Refined 
petroleum 
products; 
pharmaceutic
als. 
Oil; gold. In clothing in order to 
gain AGOA access to 
US; oil in Sudan and 
elsewhere. 
Geographically 
concentrated in E Africa, 
but growing in Libya and 
Ivory Coast. 
Predominantly lines of credit 
tied to Indian goods. But 
recent years seen substantial 
increase, linked to access to 
minerals and oil. 
Indian government becoming 
more active in promoting a 
strategic focus, especially in 
minerals sector. More 
focused in its approach to 
Africa than China. India-
Africa Summit (14 countries) 
established 2008. 
Very little. Mainly 
through Indian-
organised forum, 
which is less 
developed than 
that of FOCAC. 
Malaysia A source of oil, 
minerals, coca, 
oil . 
A source of  
vegetable 
oils, some 
machinery, 
and technical 
assistance. 
Vegetable 
oils. 
Oils and 
minerals 
Little 
integration 
of vectors.  
Historically concentrated 
in Mauritius and S 
Africa. Recent rise in 
investments in oil, gas, 
and energy by Petronas 
and investments in palm 
oil dominates all other 
flows. 
Mostly technical assistance. 
Increasingly Africa features 
relatively highly in Malaysia’s 
external aid programme. 
Most l inks through multilateral 
forums (for example, the 
Commonwealth). Southern 
African International Dialogue 
established in 2005. 
Only South Africa 
has had an explicit, 
albeit loose, 
strategy towards 
Malaysia. 
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 Africa’s 
importance to 
emerging 
economy 
Emerging 
economy’s 
importance 
for Africa 
Export to 
Africa 
Imports from 
Africa 
FDI to Africa Aid to Africa Strategic integration 
by emerging economy 
Strategic 
integration by 
Africa 
Russia Russia sees 
Africa as a partner 
and potential 
competitor in a 
range of natural 
resource sectors, 
particularly 
mining, oil and 
gas.  
Russia has a 
similar export 
profile to that 
of Africa – 
mainly 
resource-
based 
products. 
Agricultural 
products, 
predominantly 
to North 
Africa. 
Raw materials 
- ores and 
unprocessed 
foodstuffs. 
Almost all FDI in 
Africa has been in 
the minerals sector, 
and much of it in 
Southern Africa. 
Russian aid to Africa has 
been limited and mostly 
channelled through 
multilateral agencies. 
There appears to be no 
sign of coordinated 
activity amongst the 
various vectors of 
interaction with Africa. 
 
The clearest signs of an 
emergent strategy 
towards Africa appear to 
be in relation to South 
Africa and in relation to 
investment by major 
Russian firms in the 
minerals and diamonds 
sectors.  
There are few 
signs of an 
emergent strategy 
from Africa 
towards Russia. 
South 
Korea 
Korea has no oil 
of its own and is 
the worlds fifth 
largest consumer 
of oil. 
Source of oil 
and minerals; 
market for 
manufactured 
exports. 
Shipping and 
automobiles, 
plus other 
manufactured 
goods. 
Oil. Mining , Hotels and 
Tourism, 
Manufacturing. 
Aid programme distinguishes 
between African partners with 
developmental needs, and 
strategic partners (oil and 
mineral assets). 
Historically Korea has 
lacked a strategy for 
Africa. In recent years 
this has changed, with 
an increasing trend 
towards the integration 
of trade, FDI and aid, as 
well as the 
establishment of the 
Korea Initiative for 
African Development 
Given Korea’s 
limited 
engagement with 
African countries, 
there are few 
signs of a 
cohesive African 
policy towards 
Korea.   
 
Turkey Africa is an 
important  market  
for its industrial 
outputs 
Gold, gas. Metal products 
for 
construction 
sector. 
Gold and oil . Historically in North 
Africa, but now 
spreading widely 
over Africa. Many 
investments are 
small in scale. 
Aid has risen steadily, but 
from a low base. Africa 
receives only a small share of 
Turkey’s aid budget. In recent 
years, Sudan and Somalia 
have been the primary 
recipients of Turkish aid. 
Turkey has begun to 
develop an Africa 
strategy, involving 
cooperation between the 
state and the business 
sectors.  “Open Up 
Africa” policy initiated 
1998. Observer Status 
at the AU.  
Turkey seeks 
African support in 
its quest to enter 
the EU. This may 
be turned to the 
advantage of 
African countries 
seeking aid and 
appropriate FDI. 
 
Source; Compiled from Annex 
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The first key step is for African countries to recognise the power that they 
have in the context of the commodities boom and terms of trade reversal. 
Although at present only a limited number of African economies are major 
beneficiaries of this boom in terms of their current production structures, many 
other African countries have the potential to become major exporters of 
energy and mineral commodities. For example, Mozambique possesses 
significant coal and iron deposits which have not yet been tapped. 
 
The second key issue is for African countries to adopt a similar strategy of 
assimilating the vectors of integration being pursued most clearly by China, 
but increasingly also by India and the other emerging economies (Table 9 
above). Meeting the trade needs of the emerging economies – Africa as a 
source of primary commodities and, to a lesser extent, as a market for their 
exports – should be conditional upon their providing aid to exploit these 
commodities, as well as meeting Africa’s complementary developmental and 
infrastructural needs. Where appropriate, it should also incorporate FDI from 
the emerging countries, and participation in the emerging country firm value 
chains which serve global markets (for example, Chinese, Indian and Turkish 
firms providing their fabric to African countries for onward export, through the 
marketing channels of these emerging country firms, to the US and the EU). 
 
The third key strategic agenda is to develop a differentiated view of the 
various emerging economies, and of different stakeholders within them. Each 
of the emerging economies has distinct sets of interests. Turkey, for example, 
sees Africa as a market primarily, whereas for China and India, Africa’s 
importance stands out in terms of long-term access to primary commodities. 
Similarly, there are also different interest groups within each of the emerging 
economies. This is most notable in the case of the very large Chinese 
economy, where although the Beijing-controlled EXIM Bank provides the 
primary lines of credit for Chinese FDI-aid events in Africa, the primary drivers 
are the provincial governments in China. Some of these provincial 
governments are more active than others, and some concentrate on particular 
regions and countries within Africa. A new generation of Chinese FDI into 
Africa is emerging from private Chinese firms, and these display very different 
characteristics to the state-owned enterprises. For example, when copper 
prices fell precipitously in early 2009, the large state -owned firms continued to 
operate in and invest in African copper mines. By contrast there was a sudden 
and mass flight of Chinese small scale copper-smelting firms operating in the 
DRC.12 
 
The fourth key strategic issue is who in Africa is going to drive this strategic 
agenda. At the most basic level, this must necessarily involve individual 
African governments. Although they do not generally directly control inward 
FDI and trade flows, they hold the key levers which determine access to their 
economies. Each of the governments needs to make a cool, informed 
assessment of its specific attractions to the emerging economies and then to 
coordinate an integrated strategic response to offer access to the emerging 
economies in a way which best meets the needs of their domestic economies. 
                                                 
12 “Chinese copper entrepreneurs flee”, Financial Times, 20th February 2009. 
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This will involve extensive background analysis, but also the convening of 
appropriate stakeholder groups to ensure an integrated approach providing 
clear signals to emerging country partners. It is here that we can return to an 
earlier observation – formal written strategies which are not implemented 
effectively are much less useful than dynamic and active coalitions of local 
interests interacting effectively amongst themselves and with emerging 
country partners. 
 
A final arena for integrated response is in regional and all-Africa fora such as 
SADC, ECOWAS, NEPAD and the AU. These multi-country organisations are 
important for three major and related reasons. First, by aggregating African 
countries in the bargaining process, they help to avoid contradictory 
bargaining positions and wars of incentives. As has been evident for many 
decades in the diamonds sector, there is enormous power in cartelised 
bargaining. This is not just a matter of achieving the best price for Africa’s 
resources, but also of ensuring that wider objectives can be met, such as the 
construction of regional infrastructural networks to provide access for non-
commodity exporters. Second, and related to this, as observed earlier, not all 
African countries have extensive commodity deposits or are significant 
commodity producers. Their interests need to be protected by those 
economies who do have primary resources and markets of interest to the 
emerging economies. Including these marginalised economies is not just a 
matter of altruism for the commodity exporters. As observed earlier, intra -
regional trade may be a primary area for the development of the capabilities 
which are required for long term and sustainable growth so that it is in the 
interests of all parties – commodity exporters and non-commodity exporters 
alike – that these intra -regional links are strengthened as a consequence of 
engaging with the emerging economies. A final reason why the multi-country 
organisations are important is that the emerging economies themselves see 
these as important organisations for bargaining access to Africa’s resources 
and markets. This is most evident in the case of the FOCAC (Forum for 
China-Africa Cooperation), but it is also relevant for other emerging 
economies as well (Table  9 and Annex) . 
 
5.2. Emerging Economies, the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda 
for Action 
 
How do the activities of the emerging economies entering Africa relate to the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 and the Accra Agenda for 
Action? In considering these issues, the distinctive integrated nature of some 
of the emerging economies ’ activities in Africa – particularly China, but also 
India – must be borne in mind, as it tightly bundles aid (the concerns of the 
Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda) with aid and FDI.  In this they diverge 
considerably from the practices instituted and promoted by traditional donors. 
 
The Paris Declaration 
With the exception of India, all of the emerging economies considered in this 
report were signatories to the 2005 Paris Declaration. This Declaration 
addressed five major issues.  
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The first was the Ownership of Aid Inflows, that is the need for African 
economies to develop strategic agendas for leading the inflow and for 
absorbing incoming resources  effectively. This report’s discussion of a 
strategic response to emerging country activities in Africa endorses this 
proposal, and indeed suggests that this leadership may be even more 
important in confronting the strategic integration of emerging country aid than 
it is the case for aid from traditional donors. Hitherto, much of recent emerging 
economy aid to Africa – particularly Chinese aid – has been driven primarily 
by the donor’s need for resources rather than from Africa’s need for 
assistance. 
 
The second agenda of the Paris Declaration was the need to align donor and 
recipient strategies. Included in this was the need of recipient economies to 
ensure transparency in the use of incoming resources and for donors to align 
these resources with domestic diagnostic and accounting procedures. There 
is little evidence that this has been the case with emerging country aid, which 
appears to occur in a virtual vacuum in many African countries and where 
agendas are often poorly articulated by recipient economies. Alignment is thus 
considerably weaker than it is for traditional donors.  
Harmonisation between aid donors is the third issue addressed by the Paris 
Declaration. Here, too, there is little evidence that emerging country aid 
agendas – at least those of China and India – are integrated in the wider aid 
programmes of other bi-lateral donors and the multi-lateral agencies. Most 
often, emerging country aid is announced without prior discussion with 
traditional donors concerning the specialisation of different donors aid 
activities. This has also been a special problem with regard to emerging 
country participation in fragile states, notably in the case of Sudan. For 
example, Chinese aid to Angola made it possible for Angola to refuse to 
comply with the demands of the Paris Dec laration (Burke and Corkin, 2006). 
However, in 2008 there were signs that China had become increasingly aware 
of the problems posed to its own interests in fragile states, and hence the 
need to think about some of the governance issues raised by traditional 
donors. China has sent some peace-keeping troops to join coordinated donor 
efforts in the Region. 
Managing results – improved forms of assessment, monitoring and reporting – 
was the fourth issue raised in the Paris Declaration. Here the relatively closed 
nature of much emerging economy activity in Africa has meant that whilst 
there may have been significant advances with regard to the management of 
their aid programmes, this has not entered the public domain as it would have 
had these aid programmes been more closely harmonised with those of 
traditional donors. 
The final agenda item of the Paris Declaration was the call for mutual 
accountability. This included an explicit role for parliament in the aid giving 
and receiving process, as well as the inclusion of a broader range of 
development partners, including NGOs and civil society. Whatever the 
success of mutual accountability with respect to traditional donors, there is 
little evidence of the emerging economies engaging themselves in these 
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processes. In fact a distinctive feature of Chinese aid is its explicitly exclusion 
of civil society organisations from the aid and FDI relationship. 
The Accra Agenda 
Whilst recognising progress since the 2005 Paris Declaration, the Accra 
Agenda seeks to speed up progress by addressing three issues. 
The first issue is the need to strengthen recipient country ownership of aid 
programmes, and the second is to build more inclusive partnerships through 
closer involvement of parliaments, central and local governments, civil society 
organisations, research institutions and the private sector. The most that can 
realistically be hoped for in Africa’s relationship with emerging economies, 
particularly China and India, is that central governments develop a much 
sharper strategic focus, including with respect to their strategic response to 
the integrated agendas of emerging economy participation in their economies. 
It is unlikely that China will be receptive to participation of other non-state 
stakeholders. However, any progress which can be made in strengthening the 
strategic capability of African states – either individually or as a group – will be 
a major advance. 
The third element of the Accra Agenda concerns processes of ensuring 
results, accountability and conditionality. On the issue of results, one of the 
notable features of Chinese aid, but also the case for aid from other emerging 
economies, is that it has been highly results-oriented. Implementation has 
been rapid, and generally effective. In part this speedy response is a direct 
consequence of a donor driven aid programme which, at best, consults mainly 
with recipient governments, and shows little signs of environmental 
assessment audits having been undertaken. In this sense there is perhaps an 
inevitable trade-off between the calls for rapid economic results and wider 
developmental concerns.  Whilst traditional donors grapple with these trade-
offs continually, this appears to be of lesser concerns to many of the emerging 
country donors.  
5.3. Recommendations 
With the exception of Turkey, none of the key emerging economies report to, 
or see themselves as part of the DAC aid consortium. Moreover, as a recent 
UN-ECOSOC report makes clear, emerging economy aid is distinctive in other 
respects as well, that is, that it is almost entirely free from conditionality, and 
makes no pretence of including non-governmental actors in the aid-
relationship  (UN, 2008). In this sense, the involvement of the emerging 
economies in Africa stands outside of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda 
for Action processes. Whatever the desirability of this, it is a reality, and the 
recommendations which are outlined below for the key development partners 
are based on this real-world position.  
A second starting point before the recommendations for key parties are laid 
out is the recognition, observed earlier in this report, of the inadequacy of data 
on the involvement of the emerging economies in Africa – “A … main problem 
hindering in-depth analysis of South-South concessional financing flows is 
lack of accessible and comprehensive information and data”. This is 
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highlighted in the latest OECD/DAC Development Co-operation Report, which 
states “it is highly desirable that consistent and transparent accounting of 
flows from these countries is put in place as soon as possible.” (UN, 2008: 7) 
Recommendations are outlined for consideration by the following key actors : 
African governments ; the AU, the AfDB and African Regional Organisations ; 
the Africa Partnership Forum; Multilateral organisations in the UN family, the 
OECD / DAC, and the WTO; and Emerging Country governments. 
African governments  should: 
· Monitor trade, aid and FDI interactions with emerging countries ; 
· Analyse strategic objectives of emerging economies, and opportunities 
and threats arising from their entry; 
· Develop strategic focus to maximise benefits  – in the words of the Paris 
Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, to exercise “ownership” 
over these growing interactions ; 
· Interact with other African governments, AU, AfDB and regional 
groupings to maximise bargaining power and avoid wars of incentives . 
Within their specific mandates , the AU, the AfDB, NEPAD and African 
Regional Organisations such as COMESA, ECOWAS and SADC should: 
v Provide support for individual African governments in the 
monitoring of trade, aid and FDI interactions with emerging 
countries ; 
v Coordinate strategic analysis where action is appropriate at 
continental or regional level; 
v Facilitate coordinated bargaining where this is appropriate  to 
include the interests not just of commodity exporting economies, 
but also non-exporting economies; 
· The AU, the AfDB and the ECA should establish dialogue which 
provides for a coordinated review of relations with the emerging 
economies, and where relevant (as in the forthcoming UN High Level 
Conference on South-South Cooperation), involve other relevant 
multilateral organisations in this dialogue. 
 
· The ECA should provide assistance with the compilation of relevant 
statistics and through its flagship publication The Economic Report on 
Africa, monitor the trajectory of aid, Trade and FDI relations between 
Africa and the emerging country partners; 
 
· A specific challenge arises for the AfDB in how to leverage emerging 
economy support for the financing and co-financing of regional 
infrastructure ; 
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· The Africa Partnership Forum should be widened to include participation 
by non-OECD emerging economies . 
Multilateral organisations in the UN family, the OECD/DAC, and the WTO 
should: 
· Provide support for individual African governments in the monitoring of 
trade, aid and FDI interactions with emerging countries; 
· Coordinate strategic analysis where action is appropriate at continental 
or regional level; 
· Facilitate coordinated bargaining where it is appropriate; 
· Help build capabilities in recipient countries to develop an adequate 
strategic response to relations with emerging economies ; 
· Provide support to the World Bank’s call for Sovereign Wealth Funds to 
invest in the development of Africa’s infrastructure. 
Emerging country governments should : 
· Recognise that  flows of finance to Africa – both development aid and 
FDI – will entail future repayments, and that every effort should be made 
to avoid Africa entering a new realm and era of debt dependency; 
· Recognise that their long-term access to Africa’s natural resources 
depends on developing a non-exploitative relationship which provides for 
win-win outcomes. Thus resource rents should be shared equitably and 
maximum efforts should be placed on developing downstream and 
upstream linkages from the resource sector; 
· Complementary investments in infrastructure, designed to facilitate 
access to Africa’s resources, should also address the needs of the non-
resource sectors of the economies, of promoting regional infrastructure 
and of also addressing the needs of countries with no, or poor 
resources; 
· Market access should be provided for the preferential entry of African 
products into their markets. However, given poor production capabilities 
in Africa, complementary assistance is required to assist in the building 
of effective production capabilities, particularly in local firms and SMEs; 
· Tolerance should be displayed when African governments seek special 
and differential treatment in third-country markets; 
· Every attempt should be made to include African firms and farms in their 
global value chains producing for global product markets ; 
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· In the absence of participation in the Accra Agenda for Action, attention 
should be given to addressing some of its principles, not least the 
objective of ensuring country ownership of aid-inflows and addressing 
the needs of transparency and legitimacy design to prevent corruption 
and the misuse of aid. 
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ANNEX I: COUNTRY PROFILES 
A1. Brazil 
Brazil is reaching out to its immediate neighbours in Latin America and to the 
developing countries in general as  it defines its place in the global arena. Its 
foreign policy objectives provide for growing opportunities for South-South 
Corporation. Both in economic and political circles, Brazil is seeking to expand its 
influence; from ambitions to head the WTO to securing a permanent seat at the 
UN Security Council. The votes of the African countries are important in this 
regard, and accordingly Brazil is seeking to expand its diplomatic and economic 
relations with its African counterparts.  
Box A1: Brazil – Opportunities for Africa 
Brazil and Africa share many common characteristics. Both are exporters of 
primary materials, both have large tracts of land, and they also share common 
problems (e.g. HIV/AIDS).  
Brazil “lacks a strategy for Africa”. Similarly, there are few signs of a coordinated 
approach towards Brazil from any individual African countries, or from groups of 
African countries, with the exception of South Africa which actively cultivates its 
links with Brazil through a loosely defined BRICS consortium in global political 
arenas and the IBSA comprising India, Brazil and South Africa.  
Brazil’s interest in Africa reflects its needs for energy (although in recent years 
Brazil has discovered significant oil deposits of its own) and commodities, and to 
some extent a market for its technology and exports. Brazil also sees Africa as a 
major partner in its desire to increase its influence in global economic and 
political fora. 
Trade : The major opportunities for Africa in trade are in regard to a market for 
commodities. However, value added in commodity exports to Brazil have fallen, 
and only South Africa shows signs of exporting a wider range of products to 
Brazil. There is thus scope for export diversification. On the import side, Africa 
has the capacity to benefit from Brazilian expertise in biofuels and pharma 
products (including AIDS related products and services). For food-deficit African 
countries, Brazil may also be a source of animal feeds. 
FDI: In mining and construction, Africa has many opportunities to gain from the 
expertise and market access provided by large Brazilian commodities firms, 
particularly in iron ore. Brazilian firms also have expertise in infrastructure, 
although (as in Angola), they find it hard to compete with Chinese firms. 
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Aid:  There are many opportunities for African economies to benefit from 
Brazilian assistance in health care, agriculture, especially in the biofuels sector, 
and in low cost technology.  
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A1.1 Trade  
From a position of balanced trade in the 1990s, Brazil had moved into a trade 
deficit in the 2000s. In 1995, Brazil’s exports to Africa totalled US$1.6bn, but 
began to rise rapidly after 2003, to reach US$8.3bn by 2007. Imports accelerated 
in 2003, moving from US$3.2bn in 2000 to US$11.4bn by 2007. As a result the 
trade deficit with Africa increased from US$1.9bn in 2000 to US$3.05bn in 2007 
(Figure A1.1).  
Figure A1.1: Brazil’s Trade with Africa, 1990-2007 (US$m) 
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Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed via 
ESDS; March 2009.  
Brazil’s trade with Africa is concentrated on a handful of countries (Table A1.1). 
Four countries dominate in both its imports and exports - South Africa, Nigeria, 
Angola and Algeria. Nigeria and Algeria together account for 71 per cent of 
Brazilian imports from Africa. Nigeria’s share as importer has been increasing 
from 25 per cent in 2000 to 47 per cent by 2007. 
Table A1.1:  Percentage Share of Brazil’s Top Five African Export and 
Import Partners, 2007 
Exports  Per cent 
Share 
Imports  Per cent 
Share 
South Africa 19 Nigeria 47 
Nigeria 19 Algeria 24 
Egypt 18 Angola 6 
Angola 11 South Africa 5 
Algeria 7 Libya 5 
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Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed via 
ESDS; June 2008.  
Brazil’s exports to Africa are agricultural materials (mainly sugar and meat 
products), accounting for 34 per cent of exports in 2006 (Table A1.2). Parts and 
accessories of motor vehicles accounted for 5 per cent of exports to Africa in 
2006, mainly South Africa. Refined petroleum products (9 per cent) and Iron ore 
concentrates (5 per cent) were the other major products. 
Table A1.2: Percentage Share of Brazil’s Top Five Exports to Africa, 1995-
2006 
Product Name 1995 2000 2006 
Sugar and honey 44 23 23 
Meat and edible meat offal, fresh, chilled or frozen 0 3 11 
Petroleum products, refined 2 2 9 
Iron ore and concentrates 4 9 5 
Parts & accessories of Motor Vehicles and Tractors 3 4 5 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
The import category is dominated by petroleum products; imports of which from 
Nigeria and Algeria together valued at US$0.46bn in 2006. As Table A1.3 
indicates, the share of processed petroleum products has decreased significantly 
over the past decade, while that of crude oil has increased.  
Table A1.3: Percentage Share of Brazil’s Top Five Imports from Africa, 
1995-2006 
Product Name 1995 2000 2006 
Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals  6 22 80 
Petroleum products, refined 50 50 8 
Fertilizers, manufactured 1 2 3 
Gas, natural and manufactured 6 11 1 
Inorganic chemical elements, oxides and halogen salts 2 1 1 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
The largest component of Brazilian exports has remained resource based 
commodities (49 per cent). This is led by sugar and honey, followed by refined 
petroleum products and iron ore concentrates. The share of medium technology 
products has increased in the past decade, largely made up by inputs for tractors 
and motor vehicles, and motor vehicles themselves. On the import side, primary 
and resource based sectors account for almost all of the Brazil’s imports from 
Africa (94 per cent).  
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A1.2 FDI 
Brazil’s total FDI flows increased from US$624m in 1990 to US$2.28bn in 2000, 
rising further to US$28bn by 2006.13 FDI flows from Brazil to Africa are 
concentrated in the few MNC’s associated with mining. Petrobas S.A invested 
US$1.9bn in Nigeria in coal, oil and natural gas sectors in 2005 and in 2007 
made further investments in the alternative energy sector. The other major 
investor in 2007 was Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), in the coal, oil and 
natural gas sector in Mozambique, valued at around US$700m. 
 
Following the mining companies are other Brazilian firms investing in the non 
mining sectors. For example in Angola, Brazilian companies are exploring the 
telecommunication equipment as well as urban transport and the wood/timber 
sector. Brazilian firms were awarded a US$150m water supply project in 2003. In 
Mozambique, the agriculture, livestock and forestry sectors are also attracting 
interest from Brazilian firms.  
 
As many other investors head to Africa in search of oil and mineral resources, 
the infrastructure sector has taken on renewed importance. Increasing incomes 
in urban centres are opening up construction opportunities for FDI. Odebrecht; a 
Brazilian firm has projects (ongoing and concluded) in seven African countries, 
namely Angola, Botswana, Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, South Africa and 
Mozambique.  
A1.3 Aid 
Brazil’s major focus of technical cooperation and development assistance is 
focused on South American countries, who received over half of the total aid 
budget. But aid to Africa, particularly Lusophone Africa, features strongly.  
 
Since the mid 1970’s, Brazil’s efforts have been concentrated on the Portuguese 
speaking countries in Africa, namely Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principle. Coincidentally, most of these 
economies are oil exporters, or have the potential to become oil exporters. 
Lusophone Africa received 34 per cent of total aid in 2003 (Schläger, 2007). 
Angola (45 per cent of African aid) and Sao Tome and Principe (32 per cent of 
African aid) were the major beneficiaries. Of the 54 bilateral projects initiated by 
the Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC), (the main monitoring body of 
technical cooperation projects and programs) in 2005, 35 were located in these 
countries.  Between 2000 and 2005 Brazil’s debt cancellation under the HIPC 
                                                 
13 WIR data accessed in June 2008 
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initiative for African countries assisted Mozambique (US$369m), Tanzania 
(US$10m), Mauritania (US$9m) and Guinea-Bissau (US$5m)14. 
 
In 2003, Brazil agreed with Mozambique and Namibia to plan for the manufacture 
of generic anti-retroviral drugs; building from its own experience and success in 
the area. Table A1.4 lists some of the recent development assistance programs 
in Africa.   
 
Table A1.4: Brazil’s Development Assistance to Africa (various years) 
Country Brazilian Assistance Amount 
(US$) 
Angola Vocational training centres for ex-combatants  
 Vocal agricultural research institute  
 Institute to Fight Aids - through the Angolan 
Ministry of Health with assistance from 
Brazilian technicians and doctors 
 
 Regional centre for business development  
 Programme for Export Financing US$750m 
total up to 
2006 
Botswana HIV/AIDS  
Burundi HIV/AIDS  
Burkina Faso HIV/AIDS  
Cape Verde HIV/AIDS  
Equatorial 
Guinea 
HIV/AIDS  
Guinea-Bissau Vocational training centres for ex-combatants  
 Agricultural technology and know-how transfer  
 HIV/AIDS  
 Humanitarian assistance US$120,170 
 Debt cancellation US$5m 
Ghana Agricultural technology and know-how transfer   
 Emergency thermal energy plant  
Mauritania Debt cancellation US$9m 
Mozambique Vocational training centres for ex-combatants  
 Local agricultural research institute  
 HIV/AIDS  
 Regional centre for public administration  
 Creation of pharmaceutical plants to 
manufacture generic anti-retroviral (ARV) 
medicines 
 
 95 per cent debt relief from Brazil US$369m 
                                                 
14 (Schläger, 2007) 
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 Humanitarian assistance US$120,170 
Namibia Agricultural technology and know-how transfer  
 Creation of pharmaceutical plants to 
manufacture generic anti-retroviral (ARV) 
medicines  
 
 Training of marine and air force personnel  
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Agricultural technical cooperation (research 
institutes and farming techniques) 
 
 HIV/AIDS  
Senegal Agricultural support (airplane to spray 
deterrent during the locust invasion) 
 
South Africa Cooperation in the development of air-to-air 
missile technology  
US$52m 
Tanzania Debt cancellation US$10m 
Unspecified Transfer of 'biodiesel' technology  
 “Bolsa-Escola” programme  
 Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Malaria and 
Tuberculosis  
 
Source: Own compilation from (Schläger, 2007), (Harsch, 2004), and (Zanin & 
Sorbara, 2007) 
A1.4: Integration of Vectors 
There are few signs of integrated trade, FDI and aid activities in Brazil’s links with 
Africa. The major feature of these links is that imports are dominated by oil, 
exports by market access, FDI by opportunities in commodities and infrastructure 
and aid by cultural ties. Countries receiving the majority of aid are not the same 
as those receiving FDI, nor are there commonalities between major trade and 
FDI partners.  
 
Firms in resource based African economies can look towards establishing FDI 
and business ventures with their Brazilian counterparts. Brazil’s economic growth 
is linked to its own natural resources, and it shares the advantages of the 
commodity boom with many of the resource rich African countries. Although oil 
and petroleum products are the largest African exports, metal and mineral ores 
and concentrates are a close second. Brazil has experience in being a 
commodity dependent economy and African partners can gain from these 
experiences.  
 
Efforts also need to be made to offer a coherent forum for Africa to discuss 
business and trade relations with Brazil. In 2008, the Commonwealth Business 
Council, with UNCTAD, organised the Africa Americas Asia Business Summit in 
Mauritius (formerly known as the China-India-Brazil-Africa (CIBA) conference). 
Other efforts include an Africa-South America Summit held in Nairobi in 2006, 
with the objective of increasing cooperation between the two regions. Further to 
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this summit, an African-South America Cooperative Forum was set up, with 
Brazil and Nigeria set to coordinate its activities. The second summit is set to be 
held in Venezuela in 2009.  
 
The non resource rich economies also have much to gain from increased 
relations with Brazil. The technical corporation and assistance provided to some 
African countries often involve agricultural projects. Brazil is also one of the 
leading countries in bio -fuel research, and is already providing assistance to 
some African countries in technology transfer. Efforts to increase such technical 
cooperation would be of benefit for African nations facing rising fuel costs. 
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Schläger, C. (2007), Challenges for International Development Cooperation: The 
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A2. China  
Of the seven emerging economies considered in this report, China engages with 
the most number of countries in Africa, often funding investment in regions that 
are considered politically risky by others. In terms of both trade and FDI, China’s 
main endeavours have been in the oil and mineral sectors and in infrastructure. 
But the range of activities is growing rapidly, including small scale businesses 
such as trading, restaurants, beauty salons and Chinese medicine centres. 
China’s assistance to the continent has taken several shapes and forms, from 
health and education projects to the construction of official buildings, stadiums 
and roads. Trade is dominated by oil imports for China, and low to medium 
technology exports to Africa.  
 
There has been a significant strategic integration by China in its approach to the 
African continent. FDI and aid have been concentrated in economies which either 
have large oil and commodity sectors (Angola, Nigeria and South Africa), or 
which offer potential as raw material suppliers in the future (DRC). In these and 
other African economies, aid and FDI are closely integrated making it difficult to 
disentangle these two vectors as separate realms of activity. 
 
China’s strategic participation in Africa is to some extent coordinated by Beijing 
central government, particularly with regard to trade, aid and FDI credits. 
However, the drivers of active economic participation in Africa are often 
Provincial Governments in China, with their linked state-owned enterprises. 
 
A distinctive feature of China’s presence in Africa is its reluctance to exert 
pressure on African governments with regard to patterns of governance (refusal 
to participate in Paris Club transparency initiative in Angola), internal politics 
(Darfur and Zimbabwe) or process standards in production (ethical trade, 
environmental standards). However, there are signs that this hands-off approach 
is changing, with China providing an increasing number of peace-keeping troops 
in Africa. China is also very sensitive to criticism of its profile in Africa, to some 
extent reflected in its recent Aid-FDI-Trade venture in the DRC which answers 
some of the criticisms made of its approach towards exploiting Africa’s abundant 
resources. 
 
China has initiated a number of fora to enhance China-Africa relationships. The 
largest of these was the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The first 
ministerial meeting for the Forum was held in Beijing in 2000, followed by the 
second in Addis Ababa in 2003. The third forum was held in 2006, also referred 
to as the China-Africa Summit, which was widely seen as China’s attempt to shift 
up gears in its engagement with Africa.  
 
Non resource rich countries have opportunities to gain from engagement with 
Africa as well. The spread of Chinese FDI has become more dispersed in 2005 
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as compared to 1990. Assistance projects cover a wide range of countries, 
including the non mineral economies. Fabric and telecommunication equipment 
are some of the largest Chinese exports to the continent and can be source of 
expansion of light manufacturing and the services sector. Apart from minerals 
and oil, China also imports cotton from Africa, which can help the agricultural 
sector gain from trade. From 1979 to 2000, China invested in 22 agriculture 
projects at a combined value of US$48m. The challenge therefore is to build on 
these mineral and agricultural sectors and improve value addition for exports.  
 
Of the emerging economies, China has the most resources at its disposal and is 
actively seeking markets and opportunities for engagement. Africa provides such 
a base, and well designed policies can help both regions gain from the 
experience.    
Box A2: China – Opportunities for Africa 
Perhaps more than any other external actor in Africa, China’s approach to the 
continent reflects the strategic integration of trade, FDI and aid. This is driven by 
two major objectives: 
- the need for resources to fuel China’s sustained growth 
-  the need for political support as China seeks to enhance its global profile 
in economic and political fora 
Trade :  A large market for resource exports from Africa. China is a source of 
cheap consumption and intermediate goods, and cheap and appropriate capital 
goods, potential for growth in the agricultural sectors.  
FDI: Hitherto, most Chinese FDI has been large projects in the oil and minerals 
sectors. This is changing rapidly and there are increasing FDI flows to Africa in 
manufacturing and services. 
Aid: China offers abundant aid to Africa, often bundled with FDI in order to 
secure long term access to materials. This aid takes a variety of forms, including 
finance, concessional market entry, funds and technology for infrastructure, 
technical assistance and training. 
Integration: China has developed a “strategy for Africa”. There is little sign of 
Africa responding with a “strategy for China” at the national, regional or 
continental level. 
A2.1 Trade 
China’s exports to Africa increased from US$2.4bn in 1995 to US$36.7bn in 
2007. Imports also saw a significant rise from US$1.4bn to US$36.1bn over the 
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same period. China’s US$1bn trade surplus with Africa in 1995 changed to a 
trade deficit of around US$2.7bn in 2005, moving back to a surplus of US$0.58bn 
in 2007. Trade grew rapidly after 2001, as China increasingly ran out of its own 
natural resources. 
Figure A2.1: China’s trade with Africa, 1990-2007 (US$m) 
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Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed via 
ESDS; March 2009.  
In 2007 China’s largest export destination within Africa was South Africa (20 per 
cent), followed by Egypt (12 per cent) and Nigeria (10 per cent). However both 
South Africa and Egypt having been losing share in Chinese exports; decreasing 
from 26 per cent to 20 per cent and 18 per cent to 12 per cent respectively over 
1995-2007. Algeria and Nigeria on the other hand have been increasing their 
share of Chinese exports, rising from 2 per cent to 7 per cent and 6 per cent to 
10 per cent respectively over 1995 to 2007. 
 
With regard to China’s  imports, Angola is emerging as the substantial partner for 
African exports to China, increasing its share from 10 per cent in 1995 to 33 per 
cent in 2007. South Africa on the other hand has lost substantial share, falling 
from 49 per cent in 1995 to just 19 per cent by 2007. Sudan (13 per cent), 
Republic of Congo (8 per cent) and Equatorial Guinea (6 per cent) are all 
emerging exporters to China.  
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Table A2.1: Percentage Share of China’s Top Five African Export and 
Import Partners, 2007 
Exports Imports 
South Africa 20 Angola 33 
Egypt 12 South Africa 19 
Nigeria 10 Sudan 13 
Algeria 7 Republic of Congo 8 
Morocco 6 Equatorial Guinea 6 
Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed via 
ESDS; June 2008.  
China’s exports to Africa are fairly diverse products as Table A2.2 shows. The 
top five products account for only 22 per cent of its total exports to Africa. 
Telecommunication equipment (6 per cent), cotton fabric and garments (13 per 
cent) were the major top Chinese exports in 2006. The fabrics and apparel 
exports are related to the use of African countries as a base to produce for the 
US under the AGOA preferential treatment.  
Table A2.2: Percentage Share of China’s Top Five Exports to Africa, 1995-
2006 
 1995 2000 2006 
Telecommunication equipment, parts and accessories 1 1 6 
Cotton fabrics, woven  10 6 5 
Fabrics, woven, of man-made fibres  3 7 4 
Outerwear knitted or crocheted 1 3 4 
Motor vehicle parts and accessories  2 2 3 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
By contrast, China’s imports from Africa are much more concentrated by product 
(Table A2.3). Oil is the largest import from Africa, ris ing from 22 per cent in 1995 
to 78 per cent by 2006. Ores and concentrates of base metals are the second 
largest and although their share has decreased from 11 per cent in 1995 to just 5 
per cent in 2006, their value has increased from US$0.12bn to US$1.28bn over 
the same time. 
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Table A2.3: Percentage Share of China’s Top Five Imports from Africa, 
1995-2006 
 1995 2000 2006 
Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals  22 68 74 
Ores and concentrates of base metal 11 2 5 
Iron ore and concentrates 11 4 3 
Pearl, precious and semi-precious stones, un-worked or 
worked 4 3 3 
Cotton 14 0 3 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
In 1995, most of the Chinese exports to Africa were in the Low technology (47 
per cent) and Medium technology sectors (26 per cent). By 2006, High 
technology products were taking a larger share of the exports (16 per cent) as 
well as an increase in the Medium technology products (33 per cent). Low 
technology products lost share and now account for 39 per cent of Chinese 
exports to the continent.  
  
On the import side, China’s imports from Africa were biased towards the primary 
(42 per cent) and resource based (39 per cent) sectors, in 1995. Over time this 
bias has been accentuated with these two categories accounting for 96 per cent 
of total imports in 2006. China has granted GSP status to African exports; 
although it remains unclear how this will affect processed goods.  As can be seen 
from Table A2.4, Chinese tariffs on African products are a little below its tariffs on 
global imports. It is significant that tariffs on ores and metal imports are 
considerably below those on manufactures and agricultural products. And 
although there has been a large increase in the number of product lines imports 
from Africa which are free from tariffs – much trumpeted “special concession to 
Africa”, this increase in tariff-free product lines is reflected in China’s total trade. 
In fact, in the manufacturing sectors, the number of dutiable trade lines on 
African exports increased sharply between 2000 and 2007. 
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Table A2.4: China’s Average Tariff Rate and No. of Tariff Lines for World 
and SSA, 2000-2007 
Simple Average  
Tariff Rate No. of Free Lines 
No of Dutiable 
Lines No of Total Lines Trade 
Year World SSA World SSA World SSA World SSA 
 Total Trade 
2000 17.0 15.2 160 45 6,852 1,373 7,012 1,418 
2007 10.0 9.2 500 257 6,582 1,856 7,129 2,114 
Agricultural Materials 
2000 23.5 22.2 85 17 1,128 270 1,213 287 
2007 14.0 12.6 162 63 1,163 315 1,332 379 
Manufactures 
2000 16.5 14.9 31 14 5,396 998 5,427 1,012 
2007 9.6 9.2 269 152 5,090 1,447 5,399 1,599 
Ores and Metals 
2000 5.3 4.8 40 14 269 79 309 93 
2007 3.7 2.9 60 40 269 83 329 123 
Source: Data from UNCTAD Trains database, accessed via WITS July 2008. 
A2.2. FDI 
As China began to emerge in the international global scene, its outward FDI 
flows remained small; equivalent to just US$916m in 2000, not much higher than 
the US$830m in 199015. However, post 2000, FDI outflows have been rising, 
reaching US$17.8bn in 2006. The flows are expected to continue to increase, 
and reach an impressive US$72bn by 201116.  
 
UNCTAD estimates that China’s FDI in Africa has been increasing, rising from 
just US$1.5m in 1991 to US$60.8m by 2003. Besada, Wang and Whalley (2008) 
using various sources estimated Chinese FDI flows into Africa to be just above 
US$500m in 2006, rising from US$400m in 2005.  
 
                                                 
15 The reporting mechanism for FDI may have also changed after 2000, and therefore may 
account for change in reported figures.  
16 EIU  (2007) 
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Table A2.5: China’s FDI flows to Africa, 1991-2003 (US$m) 
YEAR Total Africa  Per cent 
Share 
1991 913 1.5 0.16 
1992 4,000 7.7 0.19 
1993 4,400 14.5 0.33 
1994 2,000 28.0 1.40 
1995 2,000 17.7 0.89 
1996 2,114 .. .. 
1997 2,563 .. .. 
1998 2,634 .. .. 
1999 1,774 42.3 2.38 
2000 916 85.0 9.28 
2001 6,885 24.5 0.36 
2002 2,518 30.1 1.20 
2003 2,855 60.8 2.13 
Source: UNCTAD (2007) 
In 1995, Africa’s share of China’s FDI outflows was 0.89 per cent, rising to 9.28 
per cent in 2000.  But the continent’s importance has continued to fluctuate since 
then. Cheng and Ma (2007) estimate Africa’s share in Chinese FDI flows rose 
from 2.6 per cent in 2003 to 5.8 per cent in 2004, falling back to 3.2 per cent in 
2005. The large recent investment in the DRC, as well as in other African 
countries, is likely to increase both the absolute magnitude of FDI flows to Africa, 
and Africa’s share in total outward Chinese FDI. 
 
In 2005 Chinese FDI stock in 48 African countries reached a value of US$1.6bn 
(Table A2.6). Although China’s FDI in Africa is geographically dispersed, five 
countries (Sudan, Algeria, Zambia, Nigeria and South Africa) accounted for 56 
per cent of the FDI stock in 2005.  
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Table A2.6: Distribution of China’s Outward FDI Stock in Africa, 1990 and 
2005 
Country 1990 Country 2005 
Zaire 18 Sudan 22 
Nigeria 15 Algeria 11 
Mauritius 14 Zambia 10 
Guinea Bissau 9 South Africa 7 
Zambia 7 Nigeria 6 
Gabon 6 Tanzania 4 
Rwanda 6 Kenya 4 
Zimbabwe 6 Madagascar 3 
Egypt 4 Guinea 3 
Tanzania 4 Zimbabwe 3 
Madagascar 4 Others 27 
Central African Republic  3   
Sierra Leone 2   
Libya 2   
Source: UNCTAD (2007) 
China’s investment in Africa is fairly well divided over different sectors. Between 
1979-2000, 46 per cent of investment was in the manufacturing sector, textiles 
being the main category. Much of this manufacturing investment was in the 
clothing sector, taking advantage of Africa’s preferential access to US markets 
under the AGOA scheme. Services, mainly construction, accounted for 18 per 
cent of the FDI inflows, with resource extraction accounting for 28 per cent.17 
This is a dynamic picture however, and in 2007 the State-owned Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China invested US$5.4bn to acquire a 20 per cent stake in 
Standard Bank, a South Africa based bank with extensive operations across the 
continent18. 
 
China’s FDI in oil and gas exploration has been in Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial 
Guinea, Sudan and Gabon. Investments worth US$757m in Sudanese Oil and 
US$2.7bn in Nigerian oilfields have been made in the past few years by China.  
 
The first Sino-African Business Conference in 2003 in Ethiopia resulted in 
agreements on 20 projects with a total value of US$680m. The centre provides 
business consultation services, special funds, and simplified approval 
procedures. Today, about 700 Chinese enterprises are operating in Africa. China 
established three of its first eight overseas economic and trade cooperation 
                                                 
17 UNCTAD (2007a) 
18http://www.moneymorning.com/2007/12/04/china-drills-into-africa-with-54-billion-investment/ 
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zones in Africa: Nigeria, Mauritius and Zambia 19. A further US$5bn were made 
available under the China-Africa Development Fund to assist with development 
and investment related work in Africa. 
A2.3 Aid 
China has extensive foreign economic cooperation programmes in Africa. The 
total value of these projects exceeds Chinese FDI flows into Africa; US$18bn 
have been invested in project finance from 2000 to 2006. These projects are 
more concentrated than Chinese FDI flows (Sudan 19 per cent, Algeria 15 per 
cent and Nigeria 11 per cent), representing overseas projects financed by its 
government through the foreign cooperation programme, but also includes civil 
engineering projects financed by foreign investors.  
 
Chinese assistance to Africa is coordinated by the State Council and three main 
ministries: The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Other institutions such as the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM 
Bank) and Chinese embassies in African countries also assist in finding and 
funding projects. EXIM Bank is key to the major infrastructural investments in 
Africa, providing a large fund for projects in Africa, but for which only pre-qualified 
Chinese firms can bid. 
 
Between 2007 and 2009, the Forums on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 
aimed to provide preferential loans of US$3bn and trade credits of US$2bn They 
also promised to double aid to Africa by 2009. The China-Africa Development 
Fund amounting to US$5bn has also been established to support Chinese firms 
investing in Africa. In 2006, FOCAC also announced the establishment of three 
to five Special Economic Zones for focused Chinese investment in Africa. The 
zones are being set up in Zambia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Egypt and possibly 
Tanzania.  
 
Other financial assistance includes debt cancellation usually taking the form of 
loans being turned into grants. Between 2000 and 2003, an estimated US$1.27 
to $1.38bn were converted to grants. In 2005, a further commitment to reduce 
debts by US$1.3bn was made. Broadman (2008) reports concessional loans to 
Africa reached US$800m in 2005, covering 55 projects in 22 countries.  
 
Between 1949-2006, Chinese aid to Africa was around US$5.6bn. Some of this 
aid takes the form of small or medium projects, such as a US$8.6m loan to 
construct administration buildings in Burkina Faso. Agricultural projects are also 
a favoured form of assistance with projects being funded in Niger, Nigeria, 
Uganda and Rwanda amongst others. Sugar refineries, paper mills, grain mills, 
forestry and irrigation have been common themes in projects20. A number of 
projects related to health, education, agriculture and sports are also supported in 
                                                 
19 UNCTAD (2007) 
20 Brautigam (1998) 
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Africa. Table A2.7 lists some of the projects carried out with financial assistance 
from the Chinese Export Import Bank and the China Africa Development Fund.  
Table A2.7: Major Projects in Africa with assistance from China’s EX-IM 
Bank and China Africa Development Fund 
 
Year Country Main Project Amount Type of Funding Financier 
2000 Congo Cement US$24.15m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2000 DRC Telecommunications US$9.66m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2000 Mali Cement US$18.12m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2000 Mauritius Sewage US$18.12m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2001 Sudan Power US$110m Loan EXIM 
2001 Zimbabwe Infrastructure US$7.45m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2002 Mauritius Housing Dam US$12.07m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2002 Morocco Infrastructure US$6.03m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2002 Sudan Power US$150m Loan EXIM 
2003 Congo Dam Infrastructure US$280m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2003 Djibouti Telecommunications US$12m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2003 Ethiopia Dam Infrastructure US$224m 
(total) 
Loan EXIM 
2003 Zambia Infrastructure US$600m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2004 Angola Transport 
Infrastructure 
US$2bn Credit Line EXIM 
2004 Botswana Housing US$24.13m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2004 Sudan Dam Infrastructure US$1.8bn Loan EXIM 
2004 Togo - - Concessional Loan EXIM 
2004 Tunisia Telecommunications US$16.89m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2005 Angola Energy US$1-3bn Loan EXIM 
2005 Botswana Road US$18.29m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2005 Egypt Plant Repair and 
Conference Repair 
US$16.3m 
and US$20m 
Soft Loans EXIM 
2005 Egypt Textiles US$15.85m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2005 Kenya - - Concessional Loan EXIM 
2005/6 Mozambique Dam and Plant 
Infrastructure 
US$2.3bn Loan EXIM 
2005/6 Mozambique Dam Infrastructure US$300m Loan EXIM 
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2005 Namibia Transport N$204m Loan EXIM 
2005 Togo - - Concessional Loan EXIM 
2006 Benin Economic and 
Technological 
Cooperation 
- Concessional Loan EXIM 
2006 Cameroon Military US$1.1bn Material 
Assistance 
EXIM 
2006 DRC - - Concessional Loan EXIM 
2006 Eritrea Telecommunications US$20.8m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2006 Kenya Electricity US$20.17m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2006 Kenya Telecommunications US$29.94m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2006 Nigeria Dam and Power 
Infrastructure 
US$2.5bn  Loan EXIM 
2006 Tunisia Telecommunications US$6.26m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2006 Zambia Tanzania-Zambia 
Railway 
- Concessional Loan EXIM 
2006 Zimbabwe Agricultural 
Equipment 
US$25.06m Loan EXIM 
2007 Angola Safe Drinking Water 
Project 
US$230m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2007 DRC Infrastructure and 
Mining 
US$8.5bn Loan EXIM 
2007 Eritrea Mining US$60m Loan EXIM 
2007 Eritrea Cement US$45.28m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2007 Ethiopia Hydropower/Irrigation 
and Expansion of 
Cement Factory 
US$208m Concessional Loan EXIM 
2007 Ghana Dam Infrastructure US$292m 
(total 
committed 
over 
US$600m) 
Export Credits EXIM 
2007 Ghana Power US$137.2m 
(total cost) 
 CADF 
2007 Mozambique Infrastructure US$40m Soft Loan EXIM 
2007 Namibia Electronics N$1bn Concessional Loan EXIM 
2007 Nigeria Communications and 
Education 
Programme 
US$100m Loan EXIM 
2007 Uganda ICT Backbone US$106m Loan EXIM 
2007 Zambia Plant Infrastructure US$206.55m Loan EXIM 
2007 Zimbabwe Agriculture US$200m Buyer’s Credit EXIM 
2008 DRC Fiber Optic US$33.6m Preferential Loan EXIM 
2008 Ethiopia Glass Factory Part of a  CADF 
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US$90m 
contribution 
to projects in 
3 African 
countries 
2008 Zimbabwe Mining Part of a 
US$90m 
contribution 
to projects in 
3 African 
countries 
 CADF 
Source: Davies, Edinger, Tay, & Naidu, 2008 
 
A2.4 Integration of Vectors 
China has a clearly developed strategic approach towards Africa, involving 
multiple parties on the Chinese side. Aid and FDI are coordinated so closely that 
it is not clear what components of interaction with African countries can be 
classified as aid or FDI. The strategic objectives are twofold - to obtain long-term 
access to Africa’s abundant resources (oil and minerals) and to obtain Africa’s 
support in the global arena. Chinese aid to Africa is free of conditionality (subject 
to a proviso that recipient countries do not recognise Taiwan), although there 
have been recent signs that it is more willing to consider the quality of internal 
governance in some African countries (for example, providing peace-keeping 
forces, gentle pressure on Sudan with regard to Darfur). Insecurity in many parts 
of Africa is both a problem for Chinese operations and an opportunity. The 
opportunities are perhaps more evident, since it is the very insecurity of oil and 
mineral extraction in Africa (Sudan, Nigeria and the DRC) which provides the 
space for Chinese firms to enhance their presence. 
 
There have been a wide range of forums designed to strengthen China Africa 
relationships. The largest of these was the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC). The first ministerial meeting for the Forum was held in Beijing in 2000, 
followed by the second in Addis Ababa in 2003. The third Forum was held in 
2006, also referred to as the China-Africa Summit, which was widely seen as 
China’s attempt to shift up gears in its engagement with Africa. 
 
In its engagement with Africa, China has used the three vectors of aid, trade and 
FDI effectively to establish relationships with governments. Chinese  firms, aided 
by funding from the State, especially when they are investing in aid-recipient 
countries is just one example of how China effects relations using two vectors 
simultaneously.  
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A3. India 
India’s presence in Africa is distinctively different from that of its giant Asian 
neighbour. On the one hand, India’s  presence in Africa has been built on an 
active diaspora community, particularly in East Africa, and the Indian 
Government has utilised this historical relationship to engage with Africa. On the 
other hand, it is only recently that India has begun to wake up to the impending 
shortage of many key minerals and to the energy, which it requires for its 
sustained future economic progress. 
 
It is one of the few countries in our case studies, which has a coherent, focused 
strategy for key states in Africa. Financial assistance is often coupled with FDI, 
trade agreements, accessing markets and securing energy supplies.  
 
The Indian government unveiled the “Indian Development Assistance Scheme” in 
2003. In seeking engagement with other developing companies, the promotion of 
Indian exports and strategic interests were given a priority. Development 
assistance would therefore be linked to the opening of new markets, and lines of 
credit would be extended where products from India are being used in the 
projects. India does still pursue “tied” aid, but these are not tied to political or 
governance conditionality such as democracy or transparency, but to other FDI 
and Trade vectors. 
 
Box A3: India – Opportunities for Africa 
By comparison with China, India has reacted late to the resource potential of 
Africa and its role as a market for Indian products. In recent years this has been 
rectified and India is now developing a concerted programme towards Africa, but 
concentrating on those countries with which it has clearly identifiable bilateral 
interests. This has led to a change in focus of India’s relations with Africa, away 
from a historic link with East Africa (with its Indian diaspora) towards West Africa 
and Sudan. It is now striving to integrate activities in the three vectors of trade, 
FDI and aid. This provides Africa with the opportunity to respond in kind, with its 
own focused and strategic integration of activities in these three vectors. 
Trade :  India is a source of demand for African products, particularly for oil and 
minerals, but also for some agricultural commodities such as nuts and fruit. India 
has the capacity to provide important inputs for Africa, including capital goods, 
low-price consumer goods and business services. Low cost pharmaceuticals, 
perhaps linked to incoming Indian FDI, represent a particular trading opportunity. 
FDI: Indian firms have the capacity to assist Africa in the commodities sector, in 
agriculture and in the pharmaceuticals and telecommunications sectors. 
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Aid: Indian aid, linked to incoming FDI might contribute to enhancing 
infrastructure, developing mineral and oil deposits and particularly in health and 
pharmaceutical sectors. Technical assistance and training are also key areas for 
Indian technical assistance. 
A3.1 Trade  
India’s exports to Africa rose from US$1.4bn in 1995 to US$10bn by 2007. In 
1995 imports stood at US$1.7bn rising to US$4.23bn by 2007. India moved from 
a trade deficit to a trade surplus in 2003 and has expanded that surplus to 
US$5.8bn by 2007. India’s exports to Africa grew during the 1990s, but its 
imports from Africa only expanded rapidly after 2001 (Figure A3.1). 
 
Figure A3.1: India’s trade with Africa, 1990-2007 (US$m) 
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Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed via 
ESDS; March 2009  
The top five export destinations in Africa, accounted for 58 per cent of Indian 
export to the continent in 2007 (Table A3.1). South Africa (20 per cent) was the 
major destination followed by Nigeria (14 per cent). South Africa, Nigeria and 
Egypt’s share in Indian exports has been more or less consis tent over the past 
decade, showing little diversification into other African countries. Kenya on the 
other hand has lost half of its share, falling from 16 per cent in 1995 to 8 per cent 
by 2007.  
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Table A3.1: Percentage Share of India’s Top Five African Export and Import 
Partners, 2007 
Exports  Imports 
South Africa 20 South Africa 28 
Nigeria 14 Morocco 17 
Egypt 10 Egypt 8 
Kenya 8 Tanzania 5 
Mauritius 6 Tunisia 4 
Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed via 
ESDS; June 2008.  
South Africa is also the largest exporter in Africa to India, increasing its share 
from 10 per cent to 28 per cent between 1995 to 2007. Morocco (18-17 per cent) 
and Egypt (5-8 per cent) have held around the same share in Indian exports 
between 1995-2007. 
 
Refined petroleum products were the largest Indian exports to Africa in 2006, 
even though their values were virtually non-existent in 2000 and before. 
Medication, motor vehicles and products of iron showed a modest increase over 
the decade, while rice exports fell from 20 per cent in 1995 to 5 per cent by 2006. 
Table A3.2 shows the share of these products over 1995-2006. 
 
Table A3.2:  Percentage Share of India’s Top Five Exports to Africa, 1995-
2006 
Product Name 1995 2000 2006 
Petroleum products, refined 0.01 0.01 25 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 6 10 8 
Rice 20 1 5 
Passenger motor cars, for transport  1 0.4 4 
Universals, plates, and sheets, of iron or steel 2 4 4 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
On the import side, as shown in table 3.5, crude petroleum and refined petroleum 
products were by far the largest imports from Africa, accounting for 66 per cent of 
the imports in 2006. Gold is also an important import, worth nearly US$1.5bn (10 
per cent) in 2006. 
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Table A3.3: Percentage Share of India’s Top Five Imports from Africa, 1995-
2006 
Product Name 1995 2000 2006 
Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals  38 - 58 
Gold, non-monetary (excluding gold ores and 
concentrates) 0 29 10 
Petroleum products, refined 0 0 8 
Inorganic chemical elements, oxides and halogen salts 21 23 5 
Fruit and nuts, fresh, dried 10 10 2 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
India has seen significant rise in its exports to Africa of resource based goods. 
The share of primary, low technology products exports has fallen over 1995-
2006. The largest increase was seen in the resource based sector, with exports 
rising from 8  per cent of total trade to 32 per cent over 1995-2006.  
 
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2004 began negotiating a trade 
agreement with India and in 2006 then Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, 
stated that the Indian cabinet had approved negotiations for a Preferential Trade 
Area (PTA)21. The PTA was planned in two stages, the first beginning with 
specific tariff concessions on a limited list of products. The second stage would 
look at full free trade access. The Indian government in 2008 offered duty-free 
tariff preferences under the LDC preferences to 34 African nations. These 
preferences covered 94 per cent of India's tariff lines and include products such 
as cotton, ready-made garments, cocoa, cashew nuts, and aluminium ore.22 
 
A3.2 FDI 
India’s outward bound FDI flows rose from $6m in 1990 to $1.4bn in 2002. Since 
then FDI outflows increased to $9.7bn by 2006. Indian FDI flows are expected to 
average around $13bn between 2007 and 2011, reaching $16bn by 2011.23 
Africa’s share in Indian total outward FDI flows is very volatile; the share of 
outbound Indian FDI flows to Africa was 47.8 per cent in 2000, but just one per 
cent in 200424. Between 1996 and 2003, Mauritius and Sudan accounted for 9.2 
per cent of total FDI flows each, and were ranked 3rd and 4th for Indian FDI flow 
destinations respectively.  
                                                 
21 Mandigora (2006) 
22 Vijian, P (2008) 
23 EIU (2007) 
24 UNCTAD FDI statistics  
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India FDI in Africa is concentrated in just a few countries, mainly in the East 
African region. However, there has been major restructuring in the past decade. 
In 1996, three quarters of India’s  FDI stock in Africa was in Mauritius, followed by 
Morocco (11 per cent), Senegal (7.5 per cent) and South Africa (6.8 per cent). In 
2004 the absolute level of FDI stock in Senegal, South Africa and Morocco 
changed little, but their shares dropped to below two per cent. Investment stock 
had moved into Sudan 46.3 per cent (US$912m), and Mauritius 48.2 per cent 
(US$948m). 
 
Within Africa, between 2000 and 2004 Mauritius (US$0.7bn), Sudan (US$0.9bn), 
and Libya (US$30m) were the major receivers of Indian FDI flows. Investment in 
Côte d’Ivoire is expected to grow to US$1bn by 2011, which represents 10 per 
cent of all Indian foreign investments over the past decade25. In the case of 
Mauritius, it is possible that a significant proportion of this is round-tipping, 
encouraged further by the signing of double taxation avoidance treaty between 
the two countries (UNCTAD 2004).  
 
India’s engagement strategy also seeks the creation of public -private 
partnerships to jointly bid for projects in Africa. In April 2008 the state run export 
house MMTC Enterprises India announced that it would enter into a 26-74 joint 
venture with Tata Steel to bid for mining projects in Africa, and explore 
opportunities in diamond, gold, iron ore and coal mining26. 
 
Other Indian MNCs also having a growing presence in a number of African 
countries and sectors. KET International won two contracts in 2008 in Algeria 
(US$61m) and in Namibia (US$25m) for power transmission projects. Jyoti 
Structures, also in the power transmission sector has investments worth US$24m 
(South Africa) and US$40m (Uganda) in place27.  
 
In Sudan, Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) has invested 
US$200m since 2007 for an oil pipeline project. In 2008 India agreed to establish 
a refinery in Nigeria, while buying stakes in Kenyan refineries. Furthermore 
Bharat Petroleum is currently investing US$50m in the natural gas sector in 
Kenya. 
 
One of India’s investment strategies in Africa has been the proposal of cutting out 
the “Western Middlemen”. Projects with Angola and Namibia in diamonds have 
agreed to trade directly with Indian companies, in return India has promised to 
set up upstream diamond facilities in the two countries.  
 
India's is currently looking at a US$70bn merger between India's Reliance 
Communications and South Africa's MTN in the telecommunications sector. 
                                                 
25 India Frontier Advisory May 2008 
26 India Frontier Advisory May 2008 
27 India Frontier Advisory May 2008 
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ONGC has already invested US$162m in the petroleum sector. A further 
US$200m investment was made in 2006 in the Sudan Pipeline project. In 2005 
the Indian government pledged US$10m in subsidies and US$100m in loans for 
Sudan. ONGC Videsh also operates in Libya, Egypt, and Congo.  
 
A3.3 Aid 
There are a variety of conflicting estimates of Indian aid to Africa. In February 
2008, India announced it would increase its aid to Africa by 60 per cent, 
amounting to US$20m for 2008-09 (Bajpaee, 2008) On the other hand, the EU 
estimates a higher figure of around US$100m per year (Altenburg and Weikert 
2006:24). Others, such as Jobelius (2007), suggest even higher aid flows; 
around US$300m per year and rising in the future. Broadman (2008) identifies 
US$558m extended as line of credit to African countries by the Export-Import 
Bank of India in 2006.  
 
In May 2008, the Indian Prime Minister at the Africa-India Summit pledged a very 
substantial increase in aid to the continent. This included over US$500m in the 
next five to six years, as medium term assistance including the provision of 
development grants. India has already doubled the lines of credit it offers to 
African nations from US$2.25bn to US$5.4bn in the last five years. In 2004 India, 
together with eight energy and resource rich West African countries (including 
Senegal, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Burkina Faso) launched 
the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa–India Movement (TEAM–9).  The aim 
was to provide assistance in low-cost technology together with investment 
related to infrastructure.  A credit line of US$500m was established under the 
initiative. However the utilisation of this credit by African partners is unclear.  
 
India pledged US$200m to the NEPAD process, as well as writing off debt to the 
value of US$24m as part of the HIPC initiative. This included Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana and Zambia28.  
 
Much of Indian assistance takes the form of lines of credit, tied in some part to 
the use of Indian exports. Table A3.4 shows some of these projects in recent 
years and purchase of equipment from India is a common purpose of credit. The 
lines of credit are offered to governments and conditionalities involve supply 
contracts and project exports. 
 
                                                 
28 Jobelius (2007) 
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Table A3.4:  Lines of Credit Extended through the Export Import Bank of 
India to African Countries in Recent Years 
Sr. Borrower 
Amount of Credit 
(US$ M illion) 
 Opening Date of 
Line of Credit 
Tenure 
(No. of 
Years ) 
1 Sudan 350 - 12 
2 Ethiopia 122  20 
3 Ethiopia 65 - 20 
4 Ghana 60  20 
5 Sudan 52  12 
6 Sudan 50 2008 11 
7 Chad  50 - 20 
8 Sudan 48 - 20 
9 Mali 45  20 
10 Sudan 42  13 
11 Angola 40 2006 20 
12 D. R. Congo 34  20 
13 Burkina Faso 31 - 20 
14 Mali 30 - 20 
15 Malawi 30 To be made effective 20 
16 
Senegal & Mali 
(combined) 28  20 
19 Ghana 27 2007 20 
17 Cote d’Ivoire 27 - 20 
18 Mali 27 - 20 
20 Senegal 27 - 20 
21 Cote d’Ivoire 26 To be made effective 20 
22 Guinea Bissau 25 - 20 
23 Mozambique 20 2008 20 
24 Mozambique 20 - 20 
25 Rwanda 20 To be made effective 20 
26 Mozambique 20 To be made effective 20 
27 Senegal 18 2007 20 
28 Niger 17 - 20 
29 Ghana 15 2006 7 
30 Senegal 15 2007 20 
31 Gabon 15 To be made effective 12 
32 Equatorial Guinea 15 To be made effective 15 
33 Angola 13 2010 5 
34 Senegal 11 - 20 
35 
Central Bank of 
Djibouti. 10 2007 10 
38 
BMCE Bank, 
Morocco 10 2007 7 
36 Zambia 10 2008 5 
37 Mauritius 10 2008 10 
39 Angola 10 2008 6 
41 Djibouti 10 To be made effective 10 
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40 Senegal 10  20 
42 Seychelles 8 2013 8 
43 Gambia 7  20 
47 Nigerian Exim Bank 5 2005 5 
44 
Seychelles 
Marketing Board 5 2006 5 
45 Angola 5 2006 5 
46 Lesotho 5 2007 15 
Source: Adapted from http://www.eximbankindia.com/loc.asp, accessed July 
2008.  
In addition to financial assistance through lines of credit, India also provides 
technical assistance and training. Technical training in India has been provided to 
1,000 African citizens. An estimated 15,000 students of African origin are 
currently studying in India (Thakurta, 2008). Technical assistance and expertise 
are also provided for projects and planning to many African countries. Table A3.5 
lists some of the recent projects being carried out in Africa with assistance from 
India. 
 
Table A3.5: African Projects Undertaken with Indian Assistance 
Country Project 
Mozambique, Ethiopia Rural Electrification 
Senegal, Mali Railways 
Congo Cement 
Lesotho Computer Training 
Ghana National Assembly Building 
Sierra Leone Military Barracks  
Nigeria Nigeria Machine Tools  
Senegal Entrepreneurship Development Centre 
Ghana Kofi Annan IT Centre for Excellence 
Mauritius Ebene Cyber City Project 
Namibia Plastic Technology Centre 
Burkina Faso India Farmers Project 
Senegal Village Electrification Projects 
Ethiopia Gandhi Memorial Hospital 
Malawi Lilongwe Water Supply System 
Source:  Thakurta (2008) and India Ministry of External Affairs (2006) 
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A3.4 Integration of Vectors 
India’s forays into the continent have not received the same attention as those of 
China, but nonetheless India is fairly active in the continent. Benefitting from an 
Indian immigrant population that settled in Africa generations ago, the Diaspora 
effect on trade aid and FDI is likely to be strong.  
 
Historically, there has been little integration of trade, FDI and aid by India in 
Africa. However, in very recent years this has changed significantly. As part of a 
broad strategic agenda, India has diversified outside of its diaspora base in East 
Africa and moved decisively into the oil and iron ore producing regions of West 
Africa, Sudan and Libya, and in transport in Sudan and Senegal. In each case, 
aid and FDI have been bundled together in a package, and the Indian state has 
also played a role as an investor in collaboration with one of its largest firms. 
Indian firms, too, show a growing interest in Africa, in telecommunications in 
South Africa and in pharmaceuticals in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania.  
 
The use of the three vectors of aid, FDI and trade together is seen in the case of 
Senegal. The Indian automobile giant Tata has benefited from contracts arising 
from the restructuring of public transport facilities there. At the same time India is 
also one of the largest non western donors and the largest export destination for 
Senegal.29 The Indian state-controlled oil company ONGC Videsh is also an 
example of the three vectors being used strategically by India. The company is a 
permanent participant in all interactions concerning Indian overseas petroleum 
business and the Joint Working Groups of the Government of India.30 Therefore it 
has direct input in all policy matters related to trade and aid with Africa.   
 
India also tends to have a more focused approach towards the countries it 
chooses to pursue than does China. For example, when India held its first India-
Africa Forum summit in 2008, only 14 key countries were invited from Africa to 
New Delhi. This was the first summit of its nature in India-Africa relations, but is 
expected to become a regular feature in times ahead, as India attempts to 
increase its access and engagement with the continent. 
 
One of India’s concerns is the growing influence of China on the continent and 
some of the measures, such as  the India-Africa forum, are widely seen as an 
attempt to counteract that influence. Until 2003, India’s Foreign Ministry had a 
single African division. It has now expanded to one division each for West and 
Central Africa, East and Southern Africa and West Asia and North Africa. In 
2008, Indian diplomatic missions will open in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali and 
Niger31.  
 
                                                 
29 Jobelius(2007) 
30 Company websites and Reuters 
31 India Frontier Advisory May 2008 
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A4. Malaysia 
Malaysia’s engagement with Africa has largely been under the umbrella of South-
South cooperation. Malaysia believes it can help others, especially those who 
share a colonial past, where cooperation can work for the benefit of both.  
 
Most of the assis tance provided to Africa has been on a technical level and has 
taken the form of training and guidance with matters of planning and finance. 
Bilateral engagement is now emerging – previously, engagement was mainly in 
multilateral fora.   
 
Malaysia, traditionally a large oil producer is now seeking oil resources 
elsewhere as well. Its main engagement with Africa has been through FDI, and 
the main interest has remained oil. On the export side Malaysia is increasingly 
exporting medium technology products to Africa, to tap into the growing market. 
 
Box A4 : Malaysia – Opportunities for Africa 
Malaysia is not a significant player in the African context, with historical links 
confined to Mauritius and South Africa. The major strategic opportunity for Africa 
is to use the Malaysian state-owned oil company as a bargaining chip in relations 
with oil firms from other countries, and to take advantage of Malaysian expertise 
in vegetable oils and timber. 
Trade : Market opportunities for export diversification in sectors other than mineral 
resource based products.  
FDI: Learning and finance in the o il, palm-oil and timber sectors .  
Aid: Malaysia has competences in sectors which provide an opportunity for Africa 
to learn from, notably oil-extraction, palm-oil and timber. The uplifting of formerly 
disadvantaged groups has been an important role-model for South Africa and 
lends itself as an exemplar for other African countries. 
 
A4.1. Trade 
Malaysia’s exports to Africa grew from US$0.8bn in 1995 to US$2.9bn by 2007. 
Imports rose to a lesser degree, from US$0.4bn to US$1.8bn over 1995-2007. 
Increasing exports to Africa began in 2001, followed by an increase in imports 
from 2003. Malaysia’s trade surplus with Africa increased from $0.38bn in 1995 
to US$1.4bn by 2007. 
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Figure A4.1: Malaysia’s trade with  Africa, 1990-2007 (US$m) 
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Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed via 
ESDS; March 2009.  
South Africa is the largest African trading partner for Malaysia both in terms of 
exports and imports (Table A4.1). South Africa and Egypt, Malaysia’s primary 
markets in Africa have seen a declining share in its share in Malaysian exports, 
falling from 32 per cent to 28 per cent, and from 29 per cent to 17 per cent 
respectively between 2000 to 2007. Exports to South Africa are primarily 
manufactures and machinery and transport equipment, while those to Egypt are 
manufactures and agricultural materials. Malaysia’s exports to other African 
countries cover a diverse range of products (Table A4.2), within which palm oil 
(27 per cent) has retained its share and position as the top export commodity 
over the decade. Apart from vegetable oils, there is no single product which has 
a significant share of exports, showing a diverse product structure for Malaysian 
exports to  Africa. Benin has seen a recent increase, from having no share in 
2000 to accounting for seven per cent of Malaysian exports to Africa in 2007.  
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Table A4.1:  Percentage Share of Malaysia’s Top Five African Export and 
Import Partners, 2007 
Exports Imports 
South Africa 28 South Africa 27 
Egypt 17 Gabon 23 
Benin 7 Ghana 7 
Tanzania 4 Egypt 5 
Ghana 4 Côte d'Ivoire 4 
Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed via 
ESDS; June 2008.  
In 2007, South Africa (27 per cent) and Gabon (23 per cent) together accounted 
for half of Malaysia’s imports from Africa (Table A4.1). The bulk of Malaysian 
exports in 2006 were in the resource based sector (44 per cent); which in this 
case comprises mainly of vegetable oil and wood related products  (Table A4.2). 
Medium technology products are the second largest category, rising from 14 per 
cent of exports in 1995 to 21 per cent in 2006. Low technology products have 
also increased their share from 9 per cent to 15 per cent (1995-2006). 
 
Table: A4.2: Percentage Share of Malaysia’s Top Five Exports to Africa, 
1995-2006 
Product Name 1995 2000 2006 
Other fixed vegetable oils, fluid or solid, crude, refined 29 27 27 
Animal and vegetable oils and fats, processed, and 
waxes 15 10 7 
Ships, boats and floating structures 3 0 3 
Polymerization and copolymerization products 0 1 3 
Furniture and parts thereof 0 2 3 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
There has been a significant change in the nature of Malaysia’s imports from 
Africa and four of the top five commodity imports from Africa in 2006 were not 
evident in the earlier half of the last decade (Table A4.3). Cocoa, aluminium, oil 
and iron products rose from a minimal amount in 1995 to 24 per cent, 11 per 
cent, 11 per cent and 8 per cent of African exports to Malaysia respectively in 
2006. Copper imports on the other hand have decreased, dropping from 16 per 
cent in 1995 to 8 per cent in 2006. For South Africa, ores and metals account for 
nearly half of Malaysia’s imports from the country.  
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Table A4.3: Percentage Share of Malaysia’s Top Five Imports from Africa, 
1995-2006 
Product Name 1995 2000 2006 
Cocoa 1 1 24 
Aluminium 0 22 11 
Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals  0 0 11 
Universals, plates, and sheets, of iron or steel 0 1 8 
Copper 16 7 8 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
 
4.2  FDI 
In 2004, total Malaysian outward FDI stocks was valued at US$12.8bn; 
US$1.9bn (14.7 per cent) of this was in Africa (Table A4.4). The main 
destinations of these stocks were Mauritius (33 per cent) and South Africa (24 
per cent).   
Table A4.4: Distribution of Malaysian Outward FDI Stock in Africa by 
Country, 2004 
Country  Per cent 
Share  
Mauritius 33 
South Africa 24 
Sudan 17 
Chad 10 
Egypt 5 
Namibia 5 
Ghana 3 
Other 3 
Source: UNCTAD (2007) 
Malaysia’s global FDI flows rose from US$129m in 1990 to US$1.9bn in 2000 
and to US$6bn in 2006, but are expected to average around US$3.4bn per year 
between 2007 and 201132. Africa’s share in outbound Malaysian FDI flows is 
relatively high, rising from US$1.1m (0.6 per cent of the total) in 1991 to 
US$176m (8.5 per cent of the total) in 2004 (Table A4.5).  
                                                 
32 EIU (2007) 
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Table A4.5: Africa’s Share in Malaysia Outward FDI Flows, 1991-2006 
(US$m and per cent)  
Year Total  
US$million 
Africa  
US$million 
 Per cent 
Share 
1991 175 1.1 0.6 
1995         2,488  72.3 2.9 
2000         2,026  77.7 3.8 
2004         2,061  175.6 8.5 
2005         2,972  .. .. 
2006         6,041  .. .. 
Source: UNCTAD FDI Statistics Online accessed June 2008 
In 1991, Malaysia’s main FDI stock holding was in Mauritius. However, as much 
as 43 per cent of total Malaysian outward FDI from 1999 to 2005 was in the 
services sector, mainly in financial sector, or round tripping.33 It is reasonable to 
presume that at least a substantial part of Malaysian FDI in Mauritius is round-
tripping rather than actual investment. However, the recent increase in FDI is 
dominated by the oil and gas, and energy and power generation sectors. 
 
Petronas, the State-owned oil company has been active in South Africa since 
1996. From there it has moved to the rest of the continent, based on exploration 
rights, extracting and producing oil and natural gas as well as moving into 
retailing petroleum. The main Petronas upstream operations are based in 
Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Mozambique and Sudan, and downstream operations in Chad, 
Cameroon, Egypt, South Africa and Sudan. 
 
Palm oil is one of the other sectors that private firms are exploring in Africa. This 
includes palm oil plantations and refineries. Malaysian IOI Group invested in 
palm oil refining (and property and trading) in Mauritius, while Malaysian Sime 
Darby also invested in a palm oil refinery in Egypt, Tanzania and Tunisia. The 
Bidco Group recently invested over US$25m in a new 400 tons/day edible oil 
processing facility in Tanzania. They have also invested US$130m, with other 
partners, in an integrated palm oil project in Uganda. The project will involve 
developing a 40,000 hectare palm plantation, an edible oils refinery and a soap 
plant to process raw materials from the plantation.  
 
Malaysia held its first Malaysia-Africa Palm Oil Trade Fair & Seminar, South 
Africa, in 2007. The major aim was to explore business and trade links for palm 
oil.  
                                                 
33 Ariff and Lopaz (2006) 
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A4.3 Aid 
Most of the Malaysian assistance provided to the continent takes the form of 
technical training and expertise usually provided through the Malaysian Technical 
Cooperation Programme (MTCP). The MTCP provided special training courses 
in capital market development and privatisation management for Egypt and 
Nigeria in 1999-2001. Namibia and South Africa received assistance from 
Malaysian experts in micro credit and income generating activities. Malawi 
benefited from a two year integrated agricultural project in 2000 with expertise 
help from the Malaysian Agriculture Research Institute (MARDI). Development 
planning assistance by way of experts has been provided to Ghana and Kenya in 
1997, Algeria in 2000 and Sudan in 2001/02.  
A4.4 Integration of Vectors 
Malaysian integration with Africa has been limited in the past decades. South 
Africa alone can account for a major share of trade and FDI. Malaysia’s 
engagement with African countries has usually been through multilateral forums, 
such as the Asia-Africa summit, held in 2005. Malaysia has also initiated the 
Southern African International Dialogue in 2005, which focuses on building one-
to-one relationships and networks under the wider SMART umbrella. SMART 
dialogues are an initiative of the Commonwealth focusing on approaches and 
innovations related to development. Such forums are important to allow for 
progress towards the formation of bilateral relations.  
 
On the trade and FDI side, Malaysia and Africa share many commodities where 
the latter can learn from experiences of the former. For example, Malaysia is an 
oil producer and already has investments related to the oil sector in Africa, and 
Malaysia possesses a well-developed timber and associated products sector. 
The Malaysian MNC presence in Africa is by a state owned company, which may 
offer a different management perspective to the stock listed /private MNC’s 
operating in the oil sector in Africa. 
 
Business relations can be explored and strengthened through forums such as the 
Malaysian South-South Corporation. Established in 1992, as a consortium 
comprising 85 Malaysian shareholders, it has established Malaysia-South Africa 
Business Council in Malaysia as well as the Malaysian Business Centre in 
Kampala, Uganda in August 2001. The organisation’s main aim is to explore and 
promote trade and investment opportunities in new markets, particularly the 
emerging markets. It also acts as a vehicle for trade promotions, exports and 
investments as well as the transfer of technical and management expertise to the 
host countries.  
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A5. The Russian Federation 
The former Soviet Union’s relationship with the continent goes back to the Cold 
War days, when aid and trade were often in conjunction with political ideologies. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian Federation’s focus was 
directed inwards. However, in the 2000’s Russia began to engage with a number 
of regions, including Africa.  State visits in both directions have taken place to 
explore and promote political ties in the last few years.  
 
 
A5.1 Trade 
Historically, in the period of the Soviet Union, trade was directed by the state. 
There were bilateral trade contracts between the Union and the countries, often 
Box A5: The Russian Federation – Opportunities for Africa 
 
The former Soviet Union’s relationship with Africa goes back to the Cold 
War, where aid and trade were often used as a means of political 
influence. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation 
was facing economic recession and recovering from the loss of satellite 
states; Africa was largely ignored. However, in the 2000s Russia began to 
emerge, engage and reinforce its political influence.  
 
As Russia moves towards regaining its status, Africa again has come into 
focus. Increasing its influence, to balance power not only with the West, 
but the rising powers of China and India, Russia is again looking for allies 
to realize its Super Power status.  
 
Trade : There is scope for Africa to expand commodity exports to Russia, 
including both tropical agricultural commodities and minerals. Russia is 
one of the world’s major grain producers, and is a potential source of 
supply for Africa. 
 
FDI: Russian firms are keen to develop links with new producers in order to 
provide new power-bases against the major global resources MNCs. They 
are open to alliances with African partners, as occurs in the case of the 
global diamond cartel. 
 
Aid: Hitherto, Russia has mostly been a source of aid to Africa through 
multilateral agencies. There may be some scope for leveraging bilateral 
aid by resource-rich countries. 
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based on barter trade. Since the emergence of Russian Federation, trade has 
moved more decisively towards firm and individual trade contracts. Russia’s 
exports and imports from Africa were fairly low until 2001, whereafter exports 
started to rise, with imports taking a little longer (2003) to follow suit.  
 
Exports from Russia to the African continent have increased US$0.67bn in 1995 
to US$5.27bn by 2007. Imports have risen from US$0.18bn to US$1.4bn over 
the same period. Russia’s trade surplus has grown over the years, increasing 
from US$0.48bn in 1995 to US$3.9bn in 2007 (Figure A5.1). Russia’s exports to 
Africa grew steadily during the 1990s, and then expanded rapidly after 2001. 
Imports from Africa have only begun to grow in recent years. 
 
Figure A5.1: Russia’s trade with Africa, 1990-2007 (US$m) 
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Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed via 
ESDS; March 2009.  
Russia’s exports and imports from Africa have tended to remain concentrated in 
particular countries over the past decade, mostly in North Africa (Table A5.1). 
Egypt has been Russia’s largest export partner on the continent since 1997, and 
accounts for the majority of Russia’s exports to Africa in 2007 (37 per cent). Most 
of the exports to Egypt are agricultural materials and food. On the other hand 
Algeria (24 per cent), Tunisia (10 per cent) and Morocco (9 per cent) are all 
seeing increasing shares with manufactures as the major components of Russian 
exports.  
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Table A5.1:  Percentage Share of Russia’s Top Five African Export and 
Import Partners, 2007 
Exports Imports 
Egypt 37 Morocco 22 
Algeria 24 Guinea 14 
Tunisia 10 South Africa 13 
Morocco 9 Côte d'Ivoire 12 
Nigeria 5 Egypt 11 
Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed via 
ESDS; June 2008. 
 On the import side, the stronger partners in 1995, Egypt (20 per cent) and South 
Africa (37 per cent), have been losing share over the past decade. By 2007, they 
accounted for 11 per cent and 13 per cent respectively, of Russian imports from 
Africa. Morocco now accounts for the largest share, rising from just 3 per cent in 
1995 to 22 per cent by 2007. 
 
Russian exports to Africa cover a wide range of product as shown in Table A5.2. 
The top five products are all resource-based goods, a similar (albeit somewhat 
more processed) export structure to that of Africa. In 2006 iron ingots (18 per 
cent), wheat (18 per cent) and wood products (11 per cent) form nearly half of 
Russian exports to the continent.   
 
Table A5.2:  Percentage Share of Russia’s Top Five Exports to Africa, 1995-
2006 
Product Name 2000 2003 2006 
Ingots and other primary forms, of iron or steel 21 13 18 
Wheat and meslin, un-milled 0 15 18 
Wood, simply worked, and railway sleepers of wood 9 12 11 
Petroleum products refined 3 5 6 
Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals  1 5 5 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
Table 5.3 shows the major products imported from Africa by Russia. Ores and 
concentrates of base metals were one of the largest categories of product to be 
imported into Russia. However their share has decreased from 26 per cent in 
2000 to 15 per cent in 2006. Fruits and nuts on the other hand have increased 
their share (from 16 per cent to 29 per cent) over the same time to become the 
largest imported product from Africa by 2006. Cocoa’s share has fallen from 24 
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per cent to 14 per cent in imports, while tobacco (9 per cent) has remained fairly 
stable over the 2000’s.  
 
Table A5.3:  Percentage Share of Russia’s Top Five Imports from Africa, 
1995-2006 
Product Name 2000 2003 2006 
Ores and concentrates of base metal 26 13 15 
Fruit and nuts, fresh, dried 16 25 29 
Cocoa 24 24 14 
Tobacco unmanufactured; tobacco refuse 10 11 9 
Inorganic chemical elements, oxides and halogen salts  0 0 2 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
A5.2 FDI 
Russia’s outward FDI flows increased from US$606m in 1995 to US$3.2bn in 
2000. In 2006 they were valued at US$18bn and are expected to rise further to 
US$26bn. by 201134. However it is widely recognised (Kalotay, 2005) that much 
of the initial outflow of funds during the 1990s reported as FDI was in fact capital 
flight. It is towards the 2000’s that capital flight declined and private investment 
flows abroad took the form of productive assets . 
 
The majority of private FDI flows are from Russian mining and oil companies, 
and therefore most of the Russian-African ventures are also in the mining and 
exploration fields. This is supported by the instances of Russian FDI in Africa, 
which appear to be exclusively in these sectors (Table A5.4). Marks (2008) 
reports on Russian metal companies investment to be over US$5bn in Africa 
over the last three years. Russian oil companies have also signed contracts in 
Algeria, Nigeria, Angola and Egypt valued above US$3bn.  
 
                                                 
34 EIU (2007) 
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Table A5.4: Russian MNC Activity by Sectors in Africa, 2003-2006 
Year Country Sector 
2003 Angola, DR Congo Diamonds 
2004 South Africa Mining 
2004 South Africa, Gabon Metals 
2006 Nigeria Aluminium 
2006 Guinea, Nigeria Aluminium 
2006 South Africa Steel 
Vanadium 
2006 South Africa Vanadium 
2006 South Africa Metals 
2006 Namibia Oil and Gas 
Source: Kuncinas (2006), Nestmann and Orlova (2008), Kuncinas  (2007) and 
company websites 
In 2006, various trade and economic agendas were pursued in South Africa. This 
included the establishment of a Business Council by the Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry between the two countries. A number of mining related investment 
cooperation was also on the agenda. Oil and gas, the energy sector, the 
automobile industry and chemical production were just some of the other sectors 
where Russia and South Africa are looking to work together in.  
 
In 2006, Russia was also looking to establish closer relations with Angola, and 
apart from training assistance, was also seeking to advance cooperation in 
diamond mining, the energy sector and transport and communication. 
 
The major Russian FDI investment projects are focused on mining. Norilsk Nickel 
is the world’s largest producer of nickel and palladium. Norilsk started investing in 
South Africa in 2004. It now holds 50 per cent of the Nkomati nickel mines (South 
Africa) and acquired a 85 per cent stake in Tati Nickel (Botswana) in 2007. 
Nkomati is South Africa’s only primary nickel producer, also producing copper, 
platinum group metals and chrome.  
 
United Company Rusal is the world’s largest aluminium and alumina producer. In 
Africa, its Aluminium Division, Alscon is based in Nigeria. Alscon was 
commissioned in 1997 and acquired by Rusal in 2006. Alscon also has Alumina 
Division in Guinea.  
 
Alrosa is Russia's largest diamond company engaged in the exploration, mining, 
manufacture and sales of diamonds, producing about 20 per cent of the world's 
rough diamonds. In 2005, Alrosa signed a pact with South Africa's De Beers. In 
Angola, Alrosa is involved in three projects: the Catoca and LUO-Camatchia-
Camagico Joint Ventures and a hydroelectric power station on the Chicapa 
River. It is also constructing internal power supply lines for the provincial capital. 
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Alrosa and the Angolan state diamond miner Endiama signed a contract for 
exploration activities; intending to invest about US$14m in the project. It is also 
finalizing agreements for petroleum prospecting, exploration and development in 
on and offshore areas with Sonangol, Angola's state-owned petroleum company. 
 
A5.3 Aid 
The nature of aid provided by the Soviet Union was based on economic credits, 
military in-kind deliveries and technical assistance; for example often trucks or 
grain were used to assist African countries. Most of Russian aid still takes the 
form of technical assistance, humanitarian aid and debt relief, rather than 
financial transfers. For example, in 2005, Russia established a joint aircraft 
building venture with Egypt, as well as plans for a Russian Egypt University in 
Cairo.  
 
Evidence of direct bilateral assistance is weak. It is in humanitarian assistance 
that we find evidence of direct transfers to African states, with Algeria receiving 
US$7.6m in 2002, and Ethiopia and Eritrea receiving US$5.3m in 2003. Libya 
benefited from a US$4.5bn debt cancellation in 2006.  
 
The majority of aid and assistance to Africa is provided through international 
organisations and funds including the UN. Russia cancelled US$20bn of African 
debt through the HIPC initiative. Assistance for health care was provided through 
a contribution of US$30m to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria in 2001-2006. In 2007 further contributions of nearly US$86m were 
made. In 2005, US$8m were pledged to the World Initiative to Liquidate Polio. As 
Table A5.5 shows, the majority of aid was through multilateral agencies.  
 
Table A5.5: Russian ODA to Africa, 1996-2008 (US$m) 
Year Type of ODA 
Amount in 
US$ Remark 
1996 
Training national humanitarian and rescue staff 
at Kavumu Polytechnic Centre (Rwanda) 1m until 2000 
1998 Debt-relief 7.8bn until 2001 
2001 Global Health Fund 20m   
2002 Training of 10 peacekeepers from Nigeria n.a.   
  Training of 4 peacekeepers from Rwanda n.a.   
  Global Fund for Aids Tuberculosis and Malaria 20m until 2006 
  Humanitarian aid for emergency relief to Algeria 7.6m   
  Debt-relief 3.4bn   
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2003 
Shipment of automotive spare parts to Kavumu 
Polytechnic Centre (Rwanda)     
  HIPC trust contribution 10m   
  
IMF AFRITAC programme (regional technical 
assistance centres) 0.25m until 2005 
  
Humanitarian aid for emergency relief to 
Ethiopia and Eritrea 5.3m   
  
Humanitarian aid for emergency relief to Angola 
(WFP) 1m   
  UNHCR for Africa 2m   
2004 
Humanitarian aid for emergency relief to 
Morocco 0.5m   
2005 Global Fund contribution 40m   
  
220 Russian peacekeeping staff are deployed 
in UN operations in Africa     
  HIPC Initiative 2.2bn   
  Debt-relief 9.1bn   
  HIPC trust contribution 15m   
  Global Fund for Aids Tuberculosis and Malaria 20m until 2008 
  World Initiative to Liquidate Polio 8m   
  Regular contributions to UN WFP     
2006 Global Fund reimbursement 270m until 2010 
  Global Polio Eradication Initiative 18m   
  Advance Market Commitments 45m   
  IDA (49 per cent to Africa) 60m until 2014 
2007 
Russia-World Bank-WHO initiative: World Bank 
Booster Program 15m   
  
Russia-World Bank-WHO initiative: WHO 
Global Malaria Program 4m   
  
Russia-World Bank-WHO initiative: Staff 
Development Program 1m   
2008 Development assistance to Africa 500m unknown 
  World Bank Malaria Booster Program n.a. until 2010 
Sources: Vasiliev, (2005), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
and The Kremlin (accessed 2008) 
A5.4 Integration of Vectors 
The Soviet Union’s relations with Africa were conditioned by the Cold War but as 
Russia’s re-emergence slowly gains momentum, the relationship with Africa is 
based on new directions and motivations. 
 
There are few signs of integration between trade, FDI and aid vectors in Russia’s 
relations with Africa. Russia’s association with Africa has initially been negligible 
in aid, FDI and trade, though it is now beginning to change. Russian exports to 
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the continent are focused primarily on the North African countries, and comprise 
mainly hard and soft commodities. FDI has been focused on the resource rich 
countries, and are all in the mining sector. Aid is mostly being directed through 
multilateral organisations, and Technical Corporation is being used to form 
bilateral relationships. There are few signs of integration between trade, FDI and 
aid vectors in Russia’s relations with Africa. 
 
There are numerous opportunities for African countries that can be exploited. 
Given that Russia is an oil and metal rich country, its imports from Africa 
comprise mainly agricultural products. This provides an opportunity for the non-
resource rich African countries to tap and expand into a larger Russian market. 
Whereas other countries have concentrated on the oil rich African countries, the 
non oil sector can gain from focusing on the Russian market.  
 
The resource-rich African countries also have favourable opportunities. Russia is 
a large mineral economy itself and is looking to establish its presence as an 
energy and mineral resource leader in the world. Russian MNCs emerging from a 
centrally controlled business environment are now looking to secure their long-
term access to inputs. Heavy investment in the mining sector in Africa is largely 
seen as an attempt to secure such supply lines.  
 
Russian Mining FDI is motivated by two major factors. Firstly,  
Russian firms are now moving from a centrally planned economy where supply 
security was virtually guaranteed, to one where they have to secure their own 
production chain. Secondly, in a global environment of consolidation, the 
Russians are looking to expand their own business ventures to avoid being 
“eaten up” by other larger firms. 
 
Both these motivations can work in favour of the resource rich countries. Russian 
firms bring with them management experience of working in harsh environments, 
business and otherwise. This allows them to move into smaller African countries 
that other westerns companies may deem as too risky. The oil and metal price 
boom also allows them to bring much needed liquidity into their ventures. Small 
and medium mining firms in Africa can benefit from this; becoming part of larger 
and more resourceful firms.  
 
However, much remains to be done on the Africa-Russia front. President Putin’s 
state visits to South Africa and Morocco in 2006, were steps in the right direction. 
Russia has recently granted GSP status to African imports. African goods are 
being exempted from quota limitations as well as anti-dumping, countervailing 
and special protective measures. This should encourage increased exports for 
Africa. FDI needs to diversify in non mining sectors, and attempts are already 
underway between South Africa and Russia to invest in the automobile sector.  
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A6. South Korea 
South Korea is the fifth largest consumer of oil in the world. Having no oil of its 
own, it completely relies on the international economy for oil supplies. Korea is 
also a major producer and exporter of manufactures, and requires sustained 
access to a variety of minerals, particularly ferrous metals and coal. With rising 
resource security issues, with regard to energy, Korea is strategically engaging 
with oil producing countries, and has focused on the North African and Middle 
East oil producing countries. 
 
The Korea-Arab Society launched in 2008 included Morocco, Sudan, Djibouti, 
Algeria and the Middle East Arab countries, all major oil exporters.  
 
Box A6: South Korea – Opportunities for Africa 
Korea is the fifth largest consumer of oil in the world and has no oil resources of 
its own. Its dependency on oil imports defines its relationship with Africa. Access 
to minerals is of growing concern to Korea. 
Historically, Korea has lacked an integrated strategy towards Africa. In recent 
years this has begun to change, and Korean aid and FDI are increasingly being 
oriented towards countries who are potential suppliers of oil and minerals. 
Trade : African exports to Korea are primarily in energy-related products. There is 
scope to diversify these exports into a wider range of products 
FDI: Much incoming FDI has been in manufacturing and tourism. These remain 
important destinations for Korean FDI, but there is scope to attract Korean FDI 
into the commodities and infrastructure sectors. 
Aid: Korea provides a combination of developmental aid, and aid to countries 
and sectors which provide energy and mineral inputs. There are opportunities to 
expand these activities, as well as to encourage aid in the infrastructure and 
industries required to exploit these primary commodities. 
A6.1 Trade 
South Korea’s exports to Africa stood at US$3bn in 1995, ris ing to US$11bn by 
2007. On the import side, 1995 imports rose from US$2.3bn to US$5.9bn in 
2007. Korea has maintained a trade surplus with Africa, rising from US$0.77bn in 
1995 to US$5.3bn in 2007 (Figure A6.1).  
 
  98 
Figure A6.1: Korea’s trade with Africa, 1990-2007 (US$m) 
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Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed via 
ESDS; March 2009.  
Most of Korea’s “exports” to Africa comprise shipping products, and its largest 
export market in Africa is Liberia (Table A6.1), a flag of convenience for much of 
the world’s shipping fleet. Next to shipping in importance are exports of 
automobiles. South Africa was its second largest export partner in 2007 (18 per 
cent), with the bulk of trade in machinery and transport equipment. Angola has 
increased its importance as a market, from one per cent to 11 per cent of 
exports, while Egypt has lost share from 16 per cent to 6 per cent over 2000 and 
2007.  
 
Table A6.1: Percentage Share of Korea’s Top Five African Export and 
Import Partners, 2007 
Exports Imports 
Liberia 31 South Africa 25 
South Africa 18 Congo, Republic of 14 
Angola 11 Nigeria 11 
Egypt 8 Algeria 10 
Nigeria 8 Egypt 8 
Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed via 
ESDS; June 2008. 
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Although South Africa remains the largest African exporter to Korea, its share 
has decreased from 54 per cent in 1995 to 25 per cent in 2007 (Table A6.1). 
Ores and metals are the largest category of exports from South Africa. In the 
case of the Congo (14 per cent), although ores and minerals form a small part of 
Korean imports, the majority of the value is accounted for by oil related products.  
Algeria (10 per cent) and Nigeria (11 per cent) were the other important African 
exporters to South Korea in 2007.  
 
Ships and boats are the largest category of exports to Africa, valued at US$4.2bn 
in 2006. The share of this product has been rising over the decade from 35 per 
cent in 1995 to 42 per cent in 2006. The share of the other four products  is 
shown in table A6.2, and can be seen to have few improvements over the 
decade.  
 
Table A6.2: Percentage Share of Korea’s Top Five Exports to Africa, 1995-
2006 
Product Name 1995 2000 2006 
Ships boats and floating structures 35 33 42 
Passenger motor cars, for transport  12 9 13 
Polymerization and copolymerization products 3 7 5 
Telecommunication equipment, parts and accessories 2 3 4 
Lorries and special purposes motor vehicles 1 2 3 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
Korea’s primary imports from Africa are oil and commodities, with petroleum 
products accounting for nearly half the imports for South Korea (Table A6.3). The 
fuel category has also been rising, from 30 per cent in 1995 to 48 per cent in 
2006. Silver and platinum has been the other star category, rising from almost 
nothing in 1995 to take 9  per cent of the share in 2006.  
 
Table A6.3: Percentage Share of Korea’s Top Five Imports from Africa, 
1995-2006 
Product Name 1995 2000 2006 
Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous 
minerals  30 59 48 
Pig and sponge iron, spiegeleisen, etc, and Ferro-alloys  3 3 4 
Copper 3 1 9 
Ores and concentrates of base metal 1 1 2 
Silver, platinum and other metals of the platinum group 0 4 9 
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Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
The majority of South Korean exports to Africa in 2006 were in the Medium 
technology category (77 per cent). Low technology imports have fallen from 13 
per cent in 1995 to 6 per cent in 2006, while high technology products have 
sustained their shares (8-9 per cent).  
 
A6.2 FDI 
South Korea’s FDI outflows increased from US$1bn in 1990 to nearly US$5bn in 
2000 and US$7bn in 2006. FDI outflows are expected to increase at an annual 
average by the same amount from 2007 to 201135.  
 
Korean FDI flows to Africa rose from US$84m in 1993 to US$249m in 2005. 
Africa’s share in Korean FDI flows has fluctuated over the years, from 4.2 per 
cent in 1993 to 2.7 per cent in 2005. In 2002, of the Korean FDI stock in Africa 
(US$265m), the major shares were in Sudan (22 per cent), Algeria (21 per cent), 
Egypt (21 per cent), South Africa (15 per cent), Morocco (8 per cent) and Cote 
d’Ivoire (7.6 per cent)36.  Despite Korea’s focus on securing energy, most of 
Korean FDI into Africa in recent years has been in the minerals and tourism 
sectors. In 2006, the mining sector received 32 per cent of Korean FDI in Africa, 
followed by the hotel and restaurant sector (27 per cent). manufacturing (20 per 
cent) and wholesale and retail (12 per cent) were the other major sectors. 
Construction FDI amounted to just 2.3 per cent of total South Korean FDI in 
Africa. Table A6.4 shows the sectoral distribution of Korean FDI in Africa in 2006.  
 
Between 2002 and 2005, Korea undertook 11 greenfield projects in Africa37. 
Merger and acquisition activity between Korean and African firms has occurred in 
Egypt, Morocco, Tanzania, Sudan and South Africa38.  
 
                                                 
35 EIU (2007) 
36 UNCTAD FDI Statistics 
37 UNCTAD (2007) 
38 UNCTAD M&A Statistics 
  101
Table A6.4: Korean FDI in Africa by Sector, 2006 (Number and Value US$m) 
Category  Total FDI 
FDI in 
Africa 
Share of 
Africa (per 
cent) 
Number 247 15 6.07 
Mining Value 8,543 488 5.71 
Number 1710 8 0.47 
Hotel and Restaurant Value 2,479 412 16.62 
Number 19500 87 0.45 
Manufacturing Value 47,985 297 0.62 
Number 4873 43 0.88 
Wholesale/Retail Value 15,728 185 1.18 
Number 238 4 1.68 
Telecommunications Value 2,458 61 2.48 
Number 710 16 2.25 
Construction Value 1,943 35 1.80 
Number 645 32 4.96 
Agriculture Value 957 12 1.25 
Number 3570 20 0.56 
Other Services Value 4,675 13 0.28 
Number 901 6 0.67 
Others Sectors Value 4,774 11 0.23 
Number 32394 231 0.71 
Total in Africa Value 89,634 1515 1.69 
Source: The Korea Imports and Exports Bank quoted in Kim (2006) 
A6.3 Aid 
Most of the Korean aid is focused on its Asian neighbours. Aid to Africa was less 
than 10 per cent of overall Korean ODA for the 2000-2006 period; increasing 
from US$15.2m in 1995 to nearly US$50m by 2006. As Table A6.5 shows, 
Kenya and Angola were the major recipients in 2005 and 2006.  
 
Table 6.5: Korean ODA to Africa (US$m, net disbursements) 
 1995 2000 2005 2006 
Total; Africa 15.2 24.27 39.14 47.83 
Kenya 3.37 -0.58 10.93 15.47 
Angola 0.14 8.61 0.02 10.09 
Egypt 0.23 0.66 4.40 5.64 
Tanzania 0.34 0.26 2.37 3.84 
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Morocco 0.46 0.04 1.40 2.40 
Ethiopia 0.53 0.49 2.37 2.29 
Algeria 0.08 0.03 0.34 1.82 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.47 .. 0.26 1.03 
Source: www.oecd.org/dac accessed in July 2008. 
Korea classifies aid to Africa into two categories; the Development Cooperation 
Countries (DCC) and the Strategic Cooperation Countries (SCC). The DCC 
category focuses on the low income poorest African nations who are offered 
assistance in rural development, capacity building, training and skill 
development, basic infrastructure, health and education. Countries classified in 
this category are also likely to receive loans with a higher grant element than 
others. The SCC category is for countries that are resource rich and already 
have a significant trade value with Korea. The nature of assistance here takes 
the lines of cooperation in the development of energy and natural resources, 
promotion of export manufacturing and the expansion of ICT and infrastructure. 
Most of the project initiatives have been in resource rich countries such as Egypt, 
Nigeria, Algeria and Morocco. 
 
2006 saw the first visit by a Korean president to Africa in 25 years and it was 
here that plans for the Korea Initiative for African Development (KIAD) were 
announced. The proposal sought to increase ODA from US$39.1m in 2005, to 
US$100m by 2008. 
 
A6.4 Integration of Vectors 
Historically there has been little integration of the trade-FDI and aid vectors in 
Africa. With the exception of South Africa, the overlap between trade (Korea’s 
imports of energy are key) and FDI (in minerals and hotels/tourism) has been 
weak, and much aid has gone to countries with which Korea has weak trading 
links. However, in recent years this pattern has begun to change and Korea is 
beginning to seek for a closer integration of the trade-FDI-aid vectors. Aid is 
being focused on key strategic partners, and the mining sector is becoming a key 
sector for Korean FDI in Africa. 
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A7. Turkey 
Turkey has strong historical ties with the North African countries dating back to 
the Ottoman Empire. However, recently Turkey has made attempts to engage 
with Sub-Saharan Africa, and in this regard initiated an ‘Africa Policy’ in 1998.  
 
Box A7: Turkey – Opportunities for Africa 
Turkey predominantly sees Africa as a market for its final products rather than as 
a source of energy and other primary materials. After many years of contact with 
North Africa, in recent years it has begun to develop a coordinated strategy to 
enter Africa. 
Trade : A source for export diversification. Imports of textiles may assist Africa’s 
clothing sector 
FDI: There is scope for joint ventures in small and medium sized ventures,  
Aid: Aid may provide support for small scale business ventures, and in the 
construction and clothing and textile sectors where Turkey has distinct 
competences.  
A7.1 Trade 
Exports from Turkey to Africa rose from US$1.06bn in 1995 to US$5.95bn in  
2007. Imports rose from US$1.38bn to US$6.78bn over the same period. Turkey 
has a trade deficit of US$0.83bn with Africa in 2007. (Figure A7.1) 
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Figure A7.1: Turkey’s trade with Africa, 1990-2007 (US$m) 
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Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed 
via ESDS; June 2008.  
Turkey’s trade with Africa is heavily concentrated. Five countries (Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco, South Africa and Libya) account for 70 per cent of its exports, and 
three countries (South Africa, Algeria and Egypt) for 74 per cent of all its imports 
from Africa (Table A7.1). In recent years the importance of South Africa as an 
export market has fallen, and that of Morocco has increased. The share of Libya 
as a source of imports into Turkey has fallen sharply, from 29 per cent to 6 per 
cent between 2000 and 2007.  
 
Table A7.1:  Percentage Share of Turkey’s Top Five African Export and 
Import Partners, 2007 
Exports  Imports   
Algeria 21 South Africa 32 
Egypt 15 Algeria 31 
Morocco 12 Egypt 10 
South Africa 11 Nigeria 7 
Libya 11 Libya 6 
Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) database accessed 
via ESDS; June 2008. 
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Although no sector dominates Turkey’s exports to Africa, the largest items are 
metal products used in the construction sector. In recent years, there has been a 
rise in the significance of clothing exports to Africa (Table A7.2). Gold accounted 
for 42 per cent of all Turkish imports from Africa in 2006, with natural gas 
following in importance in 2006 (23 per cent) (Table A7.3). This explains the 
importance of South Africa (gold) and the North African economies (gas) as 
suppliers to Turkey. 
Table A7.2:  Percentage Share of Turkey’s Top Five Exports to Africa, 1995-
2006 
Product Name 1995 2000 2006 
Iron and steel bars, rods, shapes and sections  10 8 10 
Tube, pipes and fittings, of iron or steel 3 2 10 
Ingots and other primary forms, of iron or steel 2 1 5 
Outerwear knitted or crocheted, not elastic nor 
rubberized garments 1 3 4 
Household type electric and non-electric equipment 5 2 4 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
On the import side, non monetary gold accounted for 42 per cent of all Turkish 
imports from Africa while natural gas took the second largest chunk in 2006 (23 
per cent). The rest of the products in the top five list tend to have fairly low 
shares and are listed in table A7.3.  
 
Table A7.3: Percentage Share of Turkey’s Top Five Imports from Africa, 
1995-2006 
Product Name 1995 2000 2006 
Gold, non-monetary (excluding gold ores and 
concentrates) - - 42 
Gas natural and manufactured 15 30 23 
Coal , lignite and peat 4 4 6 
Waste and scrap metal of iron or steel 0 0 6 
Fertilizers manufactured 1 2 4 
Cocoa 2 2 3 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE, accessed via WITS May 2008. 
A7.2 FDI 
Turkish outward FDI increased from US$0.11bn in 1995 to US$0.87bn in 2000. 
Thereafter it stabilised, and in 2006 (US$0.93bn) there was little change over the 
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flows for 2000. An outflow of US$1bn on average per year is expected for 2007-
2011.39  
 
Other sources indicate the value of private investment flows to be much higher. 
According to Zaman (2005) the total value of investment projects undertaken in 
Africa rose from just US$578m in 2003, to US$652m in 2004, rising by one third 
to US$942m in 200540. The Turkey Africa Trade Bridge estimates the value of 
private FDI for 2006 at US$2.3bn41.  
 
Historically, Turkish FDI has been concentrated in North Africa, predominantly in 
Libya, Algeria and Egypt. However with the establishment of the Turkish African 
Trade Bridge Summits organised annually since 2006, new investment 
opportunities have materialised in other African countries. In May 2008, the third 
Turkey-Africa Foreign Trade Bridge Summit was held in Istanbul. A private 
venture supported by the Turkish government, the organisers announced 
ambitions to undertake new projects to the value of US$10bn in the African 
continent in the next three years. 
 
In recent years, Turkish firms have invested in Ethiopia, Guinea, Burkina Faso, 
Benin, the Central African Republic, Angola and Malawi for the first time. 
Currently around 150 Turkish investors are to be found in 23 African countries, 
compared to only 73 prior to the establishment of the first Turkey-Africa Foreign 
Trade Bridge Summit. Many of these are small investors and firms taking on 
small projects; such as a US$2m project in crushed rock production for road 
construction in Malawi. In addition, a number of small investments can be found 
in construction and building material businesses.  
 
A7.3. Aid 
 
Turkey’s aid covers a range of activities, providing assistance in health, 
education, transportation, infrastructure and post conflict rebuilding. Its ODA to 
Africa has increased steadily but from a small base. Most of its aid is directed 
towards Asia (Table A7.4).  
 
                                                 
39 EIU (2007) 
40 Today’s Zaman (2005) 
41 www.tuskonafrica.com 
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Table A7.4: Turkish ODA to regions (US$m, net disbursements) 
  
2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 
Asia 16.91 14.61 195.46 422.49 536.06 
Europe 4.02 10.65 30.19 96.59 81.64 
Africa 0.45 0.1 3.84 11.76 24.86 
Source: www.oecd.org/dac accessed in May 2008 
In 2008 Turkey became the 25th Non-Regional Member of the African 
Development Bank. The Turkish International Cooperation and Development 
Agency (TIKA), the main Turkish agency coordinating assistance projects has 
opened offices in Addis Ababa in 2005 and later in Khartoum and Dakar in the 
years of 2006 and 2007 respectively. Turkey has also provided 300 scholarships 
for African students to study in Turkey in 2007-2008.   
 
In recent years Turkey has signed various technical assistance and cooperation 
agreements with Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and South Africa. 
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey has offered assistance to 
Africa in the DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Sudan in various sectors from 
security to technical cooperation in agriculture, health, education and 
infrastructure.  
 
In 2006, most of Turkey’s aid has been concentrated in Sudan (58 per cent) and 
Somalia (13 per cent) (Table A7.5). 
Table A7.5: Turkish ODA to Africa (US$m, net disbursements) 
 1995 2000 2005 2006 
Total Africa 1.96 0.45 11.76 24.86 
Sudan 1.93 - 0.69 14.4 
Somalia 0 - 0 3.27 
Libya 0.01 - 3.77 1.05 
Ethiopia - 0.04 2.49 0.88 
Algeria - 0.03 1.05 0.75 
Egypt - 0.04 1.2 0.62 
Comoros - - - 0.6 
Congo, Rep. - - 0.01 0.59 
Tunisia 0.01 0.04 1.29 0.56 
Gambia - 0.01 0 0.39 
Morocco - - 1.06 0.35 
Source: www.oecd.org/dac accessed in July 2008 
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A7.4 Integration of Vectors 
Turkey has only very recently made efforts to engage with Africa strategically. 
Historically, most trade, FDI and aid have been with North African countries. 
 
Turkey’s “Open up to Africa” policy in 1998 became much more effective when it 
was supported by the efforts of the Confederation of Businessmen and 
Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON) in 2006. By organising Annual Trade Bridge 
Summits, individual and private investors are now finding opportunities and 
partners to expand business further than the traditional partners. Africa is 
primarily seen as a market for Turkish goods rather than as a source of supply 
for energy and commodities.  
 
Turkey’s ambition to eventually join the EU may also work in favour of African 
countries; if they are able to create trade and investment relations with Turkey at 
the moment, may benefit from greater opportunities if and when Turkey joins the 
EU.  
 
The signing of bilateral trade agreements with a number of  African Countries; 
including FTA’s with Egypt and Syria (separately) in 2007 and with Morocco and 
Tunisia in 2005 evidence Turkey’s willingness to increase such opportunities with 
Africa. Although the agreements have not as yet become operational they are a 
step in the right direction.  
 
Further advancement of integration on the government level can also be seen by 
Turkey’s observer status at the African Union granted in 2005 and it being 
declared as “strategic partner” by the organisation in 2008. Turkey organised a 
“Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit” in Istanbul with high level participants from 
African countries in August 2008. Turkey’s approach towards Africa is a positive 
one, and as engagement deepens, investment and trade opportunities are likely 
to increase in the coming years.  
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ANNEX II: EXPERT GROUP MEETING 
 
“Africa's Cooperation with New and Emerging Development Partners:   
Options for Africa’s Development”  
 
10-11 February 2009, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Background 
 
The Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) organized an Expert Group 
Meeting on Africa's Cooperation with New and Emerging Development Partners: 
Options for Africa’s Development on 10-11 February 2009 in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, as part of its programme of work in the context of its mandate to assist 
in Member States’ debates on new and emerging issues regarding Africa’s 
development, including the implementation of the AU/NEPAD programme. The 
Expert Group Meeting benefited from the support and cooperation of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the African Union 
Commission. 
 
The global development landscape for Africa is drastically changing with the 
emergence of new development partners such as Brazil, China, India and the 
Republic of Korea. By rapidly increasing their aid and other development 
assistance to African countries, emerging development partners have greatly 
scaled up their cooperation with Africa in recent years, within the context of 
various initiatives, such as, the Africa-China Summit in November 2006 and the 
India-Africa Forum Summit held in New Delhi in April 2008. 
 
The activities of emerging development partners are broadening the options for 
growth in Africa and present real and significant opportunities for African 
countries’ development, including the implementation of the AU/NEPAD 
programme. Moreover, much of the dynamism of current South-South 
cooperation is fuelled by these new and emerging development partners.  
 
At the same time, and in the wake of intensifying relationship between emerging 
development partners and Africa, traditional development partners such as the 
G8 countries increasingly express their interest in engaging new development 
partners for ongoing efforts in harmonization and coordinated support for Africa. 
For example, at the G8 summit in June 2007, G8 countries adopted the Summit 
Declaration for Growth and Responsibility in Africa, urging emerging 
development partners “to improve transparency of their aid and to follow 
internationally shared principles”. 
 
Objectives 
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The objective of the Expert Group Meeting was to examine the nature and scope 
of the emerging countries’ recent engagement with Africa; discuss how these 
development partners’ increasing activities impact on African countries’ 
development by creating new challenges as well as opportunities; and examine 
the response by African countries, including identifying possible policy options for 
harnessing this potential. The Expert Group Meeting also sought to suggest 
concrete ways of forging and constructing effective partnerships of all 
development partners, including between traditional and emerging development 
partners, so as to help broaden the options for Africa’s development, with a view 
to support the efforts of African countries towards the achievement of their 
development objectives, as envisaged in the Millennium Development Goals  and 
NEPAD. 
 
Participation and Thematic Focus 
 
The meeting was attended by participants drawn from various fields of expertise, 
such as the African Union Commission, NEPAD Secretariat, African 
Development Bank (AfDB), UNECA, UNDP, European Commission, OECD and 
the academia (please see Annex for the list of participants). This allowed for 
different perspectives on the impact of the engagement of the new and emerging 
development partners in Africa, as well as on the response by African countries 
and institutions, which helped enrich the discussion. 
 
The background study which formed the basis of the meeting examined the 
scope of the activities of the new and emerging development partners in Africa, 
as well as the response by African countries. The study is contained in the 
current publication. 
 
Upon the presentation of the study’s major findings by Professor Raphael 
Kaplinsky, the main author of the background study, participants reviewed, made 
detailed comments and held an interactive debate on the study. 
 
 
Opening Session 
 
Welcoming remarks were made by the representatives of the ECA, the AU 
Commission and OSAA. 
 
 
Session I: Presence of the Emerging Economies in Africa 
 
The session was chaired by Mr. Abdalla Hamdok (ECA). 
 
Presentation: 
 
  114
Professor Kaplinsky introduced the report on “Africa’s Cooperation with New 
and Emerging Development Partners: Options for Africa’s Development”. He 
explained that the arrival of the emerging economies in Africa had disrupted 
Africa in many ways and brought significant opportunities as well as challenges. 
According to Prof. Kaplinsky, this leads to the question, how can African 
economies make the most of the opportunities offered by these new participants 
on the global economic stage, and how can African economies minimise the 
potentially negative impacts posed by their growing presence. 
 
In his study, Prof. Kaplinsky dealt with three vectors of interaction between the 
emerging economies and Africa: aid, trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
While these vectors have traditionally been separated by Africa’s traditional 
development partners, it is important to note that emerging economies do not 
separate them, often leading to strategic integration between the three vectors. 
 
Discussion: 
 
In the ensuing discussion on the presence of the emerging economies in Africa, 
participants commented on the nature of the new partnerships and the 
opportunities and challenges created by them. Experts agreed on the relevance 
and timeliness of the subject and commended Prof. Kaplinsky on the excellent 
report. The experts made the following observations: 
 
There is a need for empirical studies and better information: The experts 
underlined the need for additional empirical studies on the various activities of 
the emerging development partners in Africa, including on the impact of these 
activities on good governance and the manufacturing sector in Africa. 
Furthermore, participants pointed to the lack of reliable and consistent data on 
the assistance provided by the new development partners to African countries. 
 
This new cooperation creates both opportunities and challenges: The 
experts emphasized that the costs and benefits of such cooperation for Africa 
should be clearly articulated. 
 
Participants felt that the increasing cooperation with emerging economies 
provided a window of opportunity for Africa to have a new type of relationship 
with its development partners. It was suggested that African countries should use 
the cooperation with emerging economies to build their productive capacity rather 
than as another source of aid. Experts underlined that instead of just extracting 
natural resources, the new cooperation should help African economies grow. In 
this regard, it is important to build internal capacity and expertise in Africa so as 
to increase their bargaining power in negotiations with the new development 
partners. At the same time, it was felt that cooperation with new development 
partners was creating challenges, such as those related to environmental 
impacts and labour standards. 
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What is driving this new cooperation? It was suggested that new development 
partners are driven mainly by profits and less by development impacts in Africa. 
However, it is important for African countries to benefit from this cooperation. 
 
China is not one single factor: Participants emphasized that China should not 
be seen as a single actor, since there are many different actors from China 
involved in Africa. Lack of coordination between the different ministries and 
development and financial agencies in China was cited as a problem. It was thus 
suggested that China needed to improve coordination in the delivery of its Africa 
policy, including improved coordination between the Ministry of Commerce, the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and the State Council. 
 
Africa is not one single factor: Similarly, experts acknowledged that Africa 
should not be seen as a single actor. Each African country has individual 
characteristics and emerging development partners have bilateral relations with 
different African countries. Thus, it was suggested that African governments and 
regional organizations should interact with each other to maximize their 
bargaining power. 
 
It was questioned whether it was feasible for Africa to have a continental strategy 
towards new development partners, especially taking into account the special 
conditions and differences between African countries and the impact of the 
emerging economies’ activities on them. On the other hand, it was also 
questioned whether Africa should have one strategy for all emerging economies, 
considering the fact that the emerging economies differ in their approach and 
engagement. 
 
One option suggested was to limit the list of issues to be agreed collectively to 2-
3 strategic issues (such as, for example, environmental impact). The other 
relevant issues could be left to national governments. 
 
African ownership: Experts underlined the importance of African ownership. It 
was agreed that Africa’s strategy towards the new development partners can 
only be defined by Africans, to ensure their buy-in and implementation. 
 
Dynamic picture: Participants emphasized the need to look at the dynamic 
picture and how the relations with new development partners changed over time. 
In particular, the current global financial and economic crisis had created new 
challenges and opportunities for Africa. 
 
Indirect impacts: Participants pointed out that the indirect impacts of the 
engagement of emerging economies also deserve attention (for example, 
competition for scarce global resources).  
 
Relations with traditional development partners: Experts alluded to the need 
to consider how Africa’s relations with new development partners fit into the 
  116
already existing landscape of networks. It was suggested that, in addition to a 
strategic approach towards the new development partners, Africa also needed a 
strategic approach towards traditional development partners who have 
expressed some concerns regarding the engagement of new partners in Africa. 
Some felt that the activities of both group of partners complement each other, 
with traditional partners placing more emphasis on the social side and new 
partners on the productive side. Experts also underlined the need for African 
ownership in defining the framework for trilateral approach.  
 
 
Session II: Africa’s Strategic Response to the Emerging Economies 
 
The session was chaired by Mr. Festus Fajana (AU Commission). 
 
Presentations: 
 
Professor Kaplinsky made a presentation on “The rise of China and the 
challenge to development strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa”. In his presentation, 
Prof. Kaplinsky focused on the changing global terms of trade resulting from the 
entry of Asian economies into the global economy. For example, the presence of 
Asian economies has resulted in growing price competition in manufactured 
goods. At the same time, the expansion of Asian economies has contributed to 
spikes in commodity prices. These changes in global terms of trade pose major 
strategic implications for African countries. Thus, it is particularly important to 
consider the indirect impacts of the presence of emerging economies on African 
countries. 
 
Mr. Festus Fajana (AU Commission) focused his presentation on the AU 
common position on Africa’s partnership with emerging powers. He explained 
that the role of the AU was clearly stated in its Constitutive Act – to provide a 
common platform. Mr. Fajana explained that the common position was based on 
the principle of co-development and envisaged a partnership instead of donor-
recipient relations. The common position had also identified a number of 
priorities, such as industrialization, infrastructure development, agricultural 
development, human capital development, market access and development of 
modern services sector. Mr. Fajana further explained that a comprehensive 
global review was prepared every five years to Heads of State on partnerships 
with traditional and emerging partners, in addition to the review conducted every 
two years with each partner. 
 
Mr. Fajana emphasized that emerging partners were very different in terms of 
what they wanted and what they offered – a differentiated approach was thus 
warranted. Similarly, since Africa is a continent of many heterogeneous countries 
in terms of resource requirements or bargaining power, each country should 
define their own opportunities and challenges within the guidelines and priorities 
set by the Heads of State within the common framework.  
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Mr. Fajana then turned to industrial development as a number one priority for 
Africa. In this regard, he stressed the need to tie the search for mineral resources 
to the goal of industrial development. According to Mr. Fajana, if a country is 
endowed with natural resources, they should be used to develop the 
infrastructure and human capital. Thus, any agreements between Africa and 
emerging economies need to include a component on industrial development. In 
addition to national governments, Mr. Fajana mentioned the need to involve the 
private sector and civil society who are important stakeholders in the partnership.  
 
Mr. Abdalla Hamdok (ECA) focused his presentation on the support accorded 
by ECA to African countries in their relations with new development partners. He 
explained that ECA’s primary mandate related to Africa’s development at the 
regional and subregional levels. While ECA can help African countries define the 
strategic framework, Mr. Hamdok suggested that policies are better owned if they 
are crafted by people who will implement them. He added that ECA can help fill 
knowledge and capacity gap. For example, ECA could support African countries 
through research, policy analysis and monitoring, advocacy, technical 
assistance, as well as enhance partnerships through its convening power. Mr. 
Hamdok emphasized the role of industrial development and the creation of 
forward and backward linkages, explaining that as long as Africa continues to 
export primary commodities, terms of trade will remain adverse.  
 
Ms. Chioma Onukogu (AfDB) started by suggesting that the experience of North 
Africa should be included in the report and that key action recommendations be 
specified for each stakeholder. Ms. Onukogu then spoke on the AfDB Medium-
Term Strategy 2008-2012. She explained that the operational focus of the 
strategy was on infrastructure, governance, private sector and higher education. 
Furthermore, AfDB’s Regional Integration Strategy focuses on increased 
competitiveness and enhanced trade, as well as strengthening Africa’s 
competitive position in the global economy. Regional infrastructure and regional 
integration were highlighted as key to economic growth and competitiveness in 
Africa. AfDB also emphasizes strategic partnerships with both traditional donors 
and emerging economies. According to Ms. Onukogu, AfDB is engaged in 
bilateral cooperation with a number of emerging economies. 
 
Discussion: 
 
The ensuing discussion focused on Africa’s response to the engagement of 
emerging development partners. Participants made the following observations: 
 
Implementation of the common position of the African Union: Experts 
emphasized the importance of implementing the common strategy of the AU on 
partnerships with emerging economies. It was reiterated that there were 
“winners” and “losers” in this relationship, which made it difficult to reconcile their 
various interests. It is especially important to take into account the interests of 
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non-resource-producer African countries. However, the outcome of this 
relationship will depend on a strong unified response from Africa.  
 
New policy space: Several participants noted that the emergence of new 
development partners has created policy space for African countries which they 
have been lacking for decades. Therefore, it is important to take advantage of 
that policy space. 
 
Capacity building and natural resource management: Experts underlined the 
need to build the capacity of African countries in a number of areas, including, in 
particular, the management of natural resources. In this regard, there is a need 
for an institution that African countries trust and which can provide relevant 
expertise. For example, in Europe the European Commission has the clearing 
house function that can strengthen the bargaining power of different countries. In 
Africa, ECA has tried fulfilling the clearing house function in the mining industry, 
organizing meetings at ministerial level and conducting an ongoing review of 
mining codes. In addition, there is a need to build country-level expertise beyond 
trade. 
 
Industrialization and diversification: Participants emphasized the need to 
ensure that the relationship with new and emerging development partners helps 
African countries in their industrialization and diversification efforts. It was pointed 
out that, if African countries had used the revenues from commodity boom to 
industrialize and build human capacity, it would be much easier for them to deal 
with the impact of the financial and economic crisis. Innovation was highlighted 
as another important priority. Furthermore, participants pointed to the need for an 
integrated cross-discipline approach, i.e. policies should be designed in all areas, 
not only trade. 
 
Commodity prices: Several participants expressed concern at the long term 
impact of emerging economies on commodity prices. Volatility in interest rates, 
instability of capital flows, and shift in relative prices have an impact on Africa’s 
development strategy. It was suggested that there was a need for mechanisms 
that would allow African countries to react quickly to a drop in commodity prices. 
It was also suggested that Africa’s voice would be more visible if the presidency 
of the African Union had a seat at the G20. 
 
AERC study: Participants were informed that the African Economic Research 
Consortium (AERC) was conducting a study on the impact of China-Africa 
economic relations in 22 African countries which would be published soon. This 
process could be further strengthened and used to help African countries in 
defining their response to the presence of emerging economies. 
 
Private sector and other stakeholders: Experts underlined the important role 
played by the private sector and suggested that new models and capacity 
building were needed for private-public partnerships. In this regard, the examples 
  119
of other regions could be helpful. In particular, innovation systems need to tie 
together governments, private sector and universities. The Regional Economic 
Communities were also highlighted as important stakeholders. 
 
Session III: Role of the Multilateral Community 
 
The session was chaired by Mr. Mehdi HAMAM, Officer-in Charge, Policy 
Analysis and Monitoring Unit (OSAA). 
 
Presentations: 
 
Mr. Uwe Wissenbach (European Commission) made a presentation on the 
European Union’s (EU) approach to Africa and emerging economies. He 
explained that the EU had a strategic triangular partnership with both China and 
Africa. The first round of EU-China consultations held in 2005 has been followed 
by a regular dialogue. Mr. Wissenbach explained that African partners have also 
been involved in these discussions since 2006. The focus of the debate is on 
constructive dialogue and cooperation, trying to identify areas where mutual 
benefits could be realized between the three partners – EU, Africa and China. 
The consultation process between all partners has identified four priorities which 
are in line with the priorities of AU/NEPAD: peace and security in Africa; Support 
for African infrastructure; Sustainable management of environment and natural 
resources; and Agriculture and food security. According to Mr. Wissenbach, the 
EU is ready to promote effective multilateralism which would result in a win-win 
situation for all stakeholders. 
 
Mr. Bankole Adeoye  (NEPAD Secretariat) emphasized the principle of “one 
Africa” in his presentation, adding that the integration of NEPAD into the AU 
structures was expected to be finalized at the AU Summit in July 2009. He 
underscored that the partnership between Africa and emerging economies must 
be based on common understanding and common framework. In his view, the 
partnership process must be driven by an Africa-owned and Africa-led initiative. 
In this process, NEPAD core principles can be used as a guide. Mr. Adeoye 
added that Africa’s relations with emerging economies should not be confined to 
multilateral forums. 
 
Mr. Andrew Mold (OECD) informed the participants of the recent and ongoing 
changes in the nature of OECD. A number of emerging economies have become 
members of OECD, for example, Mexico, Republic of Korea and Turkey. 
Dialogue is continuing with other emerging economies with a view to possible 
membership. Furthermore, OECD acknowledges the need to have a legitimate 
policy dialogue with emerging economies. The OECD Development Centre has 
its own membership and structure, including 11 developing country members. 
Mr. Mold emphasized that the policy research undertaken by the Development 
Centre does not require governing council consensus. He added that triangular 
cooperation was an important aspect of the work of the Development centre. 
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Mr. Cosmas Gitta (UNDP) focused his presentation on South-South 
cooperation. Mr. Gitta pointed out that a big part of the impact of the emerging 
economies was transnational in nature, including issues such as migration and 
trade, for example. Thus, it is necessary to address such impacts through a 
multilateral framework. Furthermore, there is a need for a coordinated approach 
in order to avoid ‘donor darlings’ and ‘donor orphans’ in Africa. 
 
Mr. Gitta referred to the Global Development Forum as a relatively new process 
which looked at new realities and emerging economies with a view to improve 
coordination and develop South-South cooperation. He suggested that OSAA 
could play a role in encouraging the Forum to look at important issues such as 
FDI, trade, migration and remittances. 
 
Mr. Gitta further reported that the United Nations High-Level Conference on 
South-South cooperation was likely to be held in June 2009 in Kenya. In 
preparation for the High-Level Conference, it might be useful to bring to the 
attention of the African Group the report to be published by OSAA on Africa’s 
cooperation with new and emerging development partners.  
 
Discussion: 
 
Discussion focused on the role of the international community in the partnership 
between Africa and emerging economies. Participants made the following 
observations: 
 
Importance of African ownership: It was pointed out that Africa’s objectives for 
various partners were already clearly stated in the AU policy document. Africa is 
well aware of both the opportunities and challenges posed by the new 
partnerships with emerging economies. While the international community can 
contribute by supporting African initiatives, it was emphasized that the 
development process must be owned by Africans. Some concerns were 
expressed that Africa would be denied ownership in the trilateral cooperation 
framework. It was also reiterated that the cooperation should be guided by 
AU/NEPAD core principles such as partnership and mutual accountability. 
Multilateral support should be aimed at helping Africa in implementing its own 
initiatives. 
 
Multilateral approach: At the same time, participants identified a number of 
issues which would be better dealt with at the multilateral level, including, for 
example, FDI and the emergence of ‘donor darlings’ and ‘donor orphans’. 
 
New type of partnership: Concern was expressed over the fact that Africa’s 
relationship with traditional development partners had not helped Africa integrate 
into the global economy or industrialize. Experts underlined the importance of 
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ensuring that new development partners invest resources into building 
infrastructure and capacity in Africa.  
 
Implementation is crucial: Participants emphasized the importance of 
translating statements, recommendations and strategies into action, moving 
forward in a structured way. In this regard, the AU Task Force recommendations 
need to be publicized. It was suggested that the recommendations resulting from 
the work conducted by OSAA on Africa’s cooperation with emerging economies 
could feed into political processes through the AU. 
 
South-South cooperation: It was suggested that the existence of South-South 
cooperation gave African countries negotiating power with traditional 
development partners. ASEAN was suggested as a good example of successful 
South-South cooperation. In this regard, Africa could learn from their experience. 
 
African think-tank: It was proposed that it would be helpful for Africa to have an 
entity similar to OECD-DAC to constantly look at pressing issues in Africa. Some 
participants expressed concern that the various studies prepared by the United 
Nations, World Bank or other institutions do not always reach policy makers in 
Africa. It was suggested that AERC, which has a programme of 22 studies on 
Africa-China relations, would be well suited to fill the role of an African think-tank. 
AERC works on issues such as trade financing, economic growth, poverty and 
labour markets, and Asian drivers.  
 
Empower national governments: Participants underlined the need to empower 
national governments and build their capacity. In this regard, national 
governments should be encouraged to look inwards and invest into building 
capacity and financing African policies. In particular, the need to develop the 
capacity and regulatory frameworks for natural resource management was 
highlighted. At the same time, participants emphasized the need for greater 
regional integration in Africa. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The following key points emerged from the discussions at the meeting: 
 
· The engagement of new and emerging development partners in Africa has 
created both opportunities and challenges for Africa. 
· In addition to the direct impacts, it is also important to consider the indirect 
impacts created by the increasing presence of emerging economies in the 
world markets.  
· Africa needs to ensure that it benefits from the new opportunities created and 
minimizes the negative impacts. 
· In particular, it is necessary to ensure that cooperation with emerging 
economies leads to industrial development and diversification in Africa. 
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· The importance of African ownership is crucial. 
· At the same time, multilateral support should focus on helping Africa 
implement its priorities. 
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